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“L’economista è il fiduciario di una civiltà possibile
e se gli interessi costituiti prevalgono sulle idee,
tuttavia l’economista deve stare attento alle idee.”
(Federico Ca§è, Scritti quotidiani, 2007)
“o δ"` αν"ξ"´ταστo& βι´o& oυ βι´!τ o`& ανθρ!`π!.”
(Platone, Apologia di Socrate, 399/388 a.c.)
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Chapter 1
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1 Public Policies and Private Incentives
Since its dawn, modern economic literature has devoted a considerable attention to
study the e§ects of government intervention on agents’ behavior. Public policies
indeed provide a number of explicit and implicit incentives to firms and consumers,
thus a§ecting their choices and their actions in a multitude of ways that are not
always easy to forecast and to analyze. Whether government intervention - in goods,
financial and labor markets - mitigates market ine¢ciencies or, on the contrary, ex-
acerbates them, remains an open - ideological more than purely empirical - question,
providing an answer to which goes beyond the ambition of this work, whose aim is
instead to analyze the impact of public policies and government interventions in two
di§erent contexts.
In particular, the empirical analysis of the e§ects of government policies on the
incentives of economic agents is the leitmotif of the present thesis, with two distinct
fields of application. While the first essay mostly contributes to the empirical banking
literature, with a focus on the link between implicit guarantees for bank debt and
political connections in Europe, the second one contributes to the field of education
economics and is devoted to an analysis of the e§ects of bibliometric-based hiring
and promotion schemes in Italian public universities on scholars’ productivity. The
two essays also share some methodological a¢nities. First, the two projects exploit
two di§erent identification strategies that have the common ambition of isolating
and estimating a causal e§ect of public policies on the outcomes of interest. Second,
the two works are characterized by the use of two original datasets, that have been
obtained merging multiple sources of data, some of them pre-existing and others
that have been hand-collected. Finally, the two essays share the novelty of the
research questions they aim to answer, which are relatively unexplored by the existing
literature.
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1.1 Government Bailouts and Banks’ Incentives
Chapter 2 in this thesis explores the relationship between the implicit guarantees of
state aid provided to domestic banks by national governments and banks’ funding
costs. The contribution of this research to the existing literature is manifold: first,
this is the first paper that investigates the e§ects of political connections on implicit
guarantees for bank debt; second, it is based on a large panel dataset resulting from
a merger of four di§erent sources of data relative to a representative sample of large
European banks from 2007 to 2012; finally, it proposes a novel measure of political
connectedness - the share of a banks’ board members previously employed by the
domestic government either as directors or as senior managers - that might find other
empirical applications.
The relationship between the public sector and the banking sector has been largely
analyzed by di§erent streams of the financial economics literature. One set of stud-
ies focuses on the desirability of government intervention in support of banks facing
di¢culties. Indeed, since Bagehot (1873) economists have being discussing about the
rationale for public intervention to support banks in distress, reaching mixed conclu-
sions. On the one hand helping banks in di¢culties can distort bankers’ incentives
to undertake risk (Repullo (2005)) and reduce the incentives for uninsured creditors
to monitor the behavior of the bank (Kaufman (1991)), thus leading to excessive
risk taking. Bank recovery policies can also have the undesirable e§ect of providing
incentives for banks to correlate their risks in order to maximize their rents from
bailouts in case of a systemic failure of the banking system, as shown by Farhi and
Tirole (2011). Also, according to Calomiris (2017), governments’ implicit guarantee
on bank debt is one of the “two 800 pounds gorillas” threatening financial stabil-
ity since “bank protection creates rents outside the normal budgetary process that
funds and encourages risk taking” (p. 1). On the other hand, public interventions
to rescue banks in distress can avoid the ine¢cient closure of solvent banks facing a
liquidity shock (Rochet and Vives (2004)) and, by reducing fire sales, can avert the
risk of contagion, as highlighted by Acharya and Yorulmazer (2008). In presence of
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systemic risk, central bank interventions can even mitigate moral hazard, as shown
by Dell’Ariccia and Ratnovski (2012), Diamond and Rajan (2005) and Cordella and
Yeyati (2003).
De facto, despite the controversy on the desirability of public intervention in
the banking sector, governments often use public funds to avoid bank failures, and
justify this behavior with the necessity of averting the risk of large negative shocks
that would hamper the whole economy. As a result, several financial institutions
benefit from implicit guarantees for their debt provided by national governments
and this expectation of public support has a direct and substantial impact on banks’
funding cost. Rationally anticipating that governments do not easily let banks fail,
and therefore that the cost of insolvency will be borne by taxpayers, reduces investors’
required return, thus providing an implicit subsidy to banks that have access to cheap
debt, given their risk profile. Not surprisingly, the financial companies that benefit the
most from such implicit guarantees are those banks that are large and systemically
important and whose failures would put at risk the stability of the whole banking
sector. This too-big-to-fail (TBTF) mechanism has become increasingly popular,
especially after the 2008 financial crisis, and a vast literature has been dealing with
it. An exhaustive review of these studies is provided in Section 2.1.
Another source of connection among banks and the public sector is provided by
the so-called bank-sovereign nexus - i.e., an adverse feedback loop between sovereign
debt and the stability of the banking sector - that has been modeled and documented
by several authors, including Acharya, Drechsler and Schnabl (2013) and Gennaioli,
Martin and Rossi (2014), among others. One of the drivers of this loop is the so-called
home bias, that is, the large exposure of domestic banks to public debt, especially in
fiscally stressed countries. Two main hypothesis have been provided to explain this
evidence by scholars: a carry trade hypothesis, according to which undercapitalized
banks increased their exposure to sovereign debt when returns from the latter became
particularly high, thus adopting a “gamble for resurrection strategy”, and a moral
suasion one, with governments that put pressure on domestic banks to purchase
sovereign debt in periods of high financing needs of the government. Evidence in
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support of the carry trade hypothesis is provided by Buch, Koetter and Ohls (2016),
in a sample of German banks, as well as by Acharya and Ste§en (2015) that docu-
ment how banks located into those countries mostly a§ected by the sovereign debt
crisis increased their exposure to high-yield domestic sovereign debt, actually bet-
ting on their own survival (coherently with Diamond and Rajan (2011) risk-shifting
hypothesis according to which banks located into countries at risk of default have
incentives to allocate their risk in the state of nature in which they would probably
su§er from a bank run in any case).
The moral suasion channel is also documented by several scholars. Among those,
Ongena, Popov and van Horen (2016) find evidence of an increase of domestic banks’
exposure to sovereign debt in fiscally stressed countries, with the e§ect being stronger
for state-owned banks. Further evidence of moral suasion is provided by De Marco
and Macchiavelli (2016), that document how banks with stronger political connec-
tions - that is, state-owned banks and banks with former politicians sitting in the
board of directors - were characterized by a larger home bias that unconnected banks,
especially in GIIPS countries. Relatedly, Altavilla, Pagano and Simonelli (2016)
show that both a moral suasion and a carry trade motive were contemporaneously
at work during the European sovereign debt crisis, when recently bailed-out and
undercapitalized banks increased their holdings of domestic public debt more than
other banks.
What remains relatively unexplored by the literature are the determinants of the
expected amount of state aid of banks, other than size and systemic importance.
The aim of the analysis presented in Chapter 2 is exactly to shed light on another
possible determinants of implicit guarantees: political connectedness, whose e§ect
is estimated in a sample of European banks. Given the nature of the dataset used
for this analysis - that combines bank’s balance sheet and board-specific data with
credit ratings and information about state aids approved by the European Union -
the methodology adopted to this purpose is a relatively standard panel analysis. To
capture the e§ect of political connections on credit rating uplifts, long-term ratings
and the likelihood of state aid (the main variables of interests in the analysis)
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I estimate several di§erent specifications with panel data techniques. A possible
concern for the causal interpretation of the results is that unobservables that correlate
with both implicit guarantees and political connections might lead to endogeneity
problems. I tackle this endogeneity concern in two ways: firstly, I exploit the variation
of banks’ baseline ratings over time and the di§erential e§ect of political connections
on long-term ratings depending on banks’ financial strength - this e§ect being larger
the lower the baseline rating - to estimate the e§ect of the interaction between the
former and the measure of political connections in a model with bank fixed e§ects,
that account for any bank-specific and time-invariant unobservable that might a§ect
the estimates. Second, I exploit the exogenous nature of the 2010-2011 European
sovereign debt crisis to estimate the di§erential impact of political connectedness in
those country mostly a§ected by the crisis. A more detailed discussion about the
empirical methodology is provided in Section 2.2.
The main results in Chapter 2 - whose detailed description is contained in details
Section 2.3 - are the following: i) political connections increase both the credit rating
uplifts and the long-term ratings, controlling for the baseline ones; ii) the impact
of political connections is larger for banks whose baseline rating is lower; iii) the
e§ect of political connectedness on implicit government guarantees is lower during
the sovereign debt crisis in the countries mostly a§ected by the latter; iv) political
connections a§ect implicit bank guarantees both at the intensive and at the extensive
margin; v) the higher expectation of state aid driven by political connectedness and
embedded in credit rating uplifts translates into a higher likelihood of state aid for
European banks.
1.2 Regulation of the University Labor Market and Acad-
emic Productivity
The focus of the second essay is on the e§ects of government policies on academics’
incentives towards research. Given the importance of public education in most of the
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European countries, where higher-education is mainly provided by the public sector,
understanding the response of scholars to di§erent hiring and promotion schemes
become crucial, especially when these schemes are designed exactly with the goal
of promoting research. This is for instance the case with the centralized evaluation
systems introduced in recent years in Spain and Italy, among others, to limit the
access to university professorship to candidates complying with minimum standards
established at the national level. Whether such bibliometric-based mechanisms actu-
ally increase scholars’ productivity or not - for instance by “crowding out” scholars’
intrinsic motivation - is clearly a crucial question in education economics. It is also
worth analyzing whether an eventual increase in the productivity of scholars - mea-
sured by the number of publications - occurs at the detriment of the average quality
of their research. However, providing an answer to such questions is empirically
challenging, since it is often impossible to disentangle all the factors that determine
research productivity. As a result, the literature in this area is relatively scarce
and belongs to two main strands: one focusing on the post-tenure productivity of
scholars, mostly developed during the 90s, and a more recent one that deals with
post-prize productivity in academia. Most of this literature however, tends to agree
on the conclusion that, once scholars reach tenure or get promoted, their productivity
declines.1
Chapter 3 in this thesis aims to provide an answer to the questions discussed
above by exploiting the introduction of the National Scientific Habilitation in Italy
in 2012 and proposing a triple regression discontinuity approach where the research
production of barely successful and unsuccessful candidates is compared in order to
estimate the causal e§ect of the habilitation on academics’ productivity. This work
not only contributes to the education economic literature but also to the applied
econometrics’ one, since the triple regression discontinuity setting proposed is novel
in the literature and can find other empirical applications.
Since the early 2000s, regression discontinuity design became increasingly popular
in several fields of applied economics. The main advantage o§ered by such method-
1An exhaustive review of this literature is provided in Section 3.1.
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ology consists in the possibility of evaluating the causal e§ect of an intervention
on a given outcome of interest by exploiting the discontinuity in the probability of
receiving the treatment depending on the value of a specific running variable and
its distance from a given threshold. As long as all the other covariates that might
correlate with the variable of interest are continuous around the threshold, any dis-
continuity that emerges at the cuto§ can be therefore attributed to the treatment
itself. A few authors recently extended the application of regression discontinuities
to the case of multiple cuto§s - where the treatment is received if a score is above
a cuto§ that can in principle vary across observations - and to the case of multiple
running variables, where eligibility for the treatment depends on being above a given
threshold in more than a single score.2 Since the general rule introduced by the Na-
tional Scientific Habilitation states that candidates get the habilitation depending on
their score in three di§erent bibliometric indicators, given some sector specific thresh-
olds, this work proposes a combination of the two aforementioned extension of RD
designs in a novel fuzzy regression discontinuity setting with several sector-specific
cuto§s and multiple running variables, i.e. the three bibliometric indicators. As a
result, this methodology allows to estimate the e§ect of obtaining the habilitation
- thus getting one step closer to tenure - on di§erent research outcomes measuring
scholars’ productivity, both in terms of quantity and quality of the articles produced
after 2012.
To this purpose, a massive work of data collection, whose details will be discussed
in Section 3.4, has been performed. Indeed, the dataset used for this analysis comes
from three main sources. The website of the MIUR was searched to obtain data on all
the candidates to the first call of the NSH, in 2012, including the candidate-specific
indicators, sector medians, and the academic position of each applicant at the time
of the application. This information has been merged with all available publication-
level data relative to Italian scholars, obtained through SCOPUS, and including
2Among others Cattaneo, Keele, Titiunik and Vazquez-Bare (2016) discuss the methods and the
intepretation of the estimates in RD designs with multiple cuto§s; Papay, Willett and Murname
(2016), instead, propose an estimation methodology that can be applied in presence of more than
a single running variable.
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detailed information about each publication and the corresponding authors. Using
the information about the journals, each publication has been then matched with the
Scimago Journal Ranking (SJR) of the corresponding journal, that has been obtained
from SCIMAGO, and publications have been ranked depending on the quartile of
the sector-specific distribution of the SJR. Finally, a number of algorithms to solve
most of the omonymy-related problems and to correctly match each candidate to the
NSH with its publications period has been used, thus obtaining a final dataset that
contains yearly data on over 40 thousands scholars over the 2009-2016 period.
Estimating the triple regression discontinuity design above described on this ex-
haustive set of data gives the following two main results: i) the professors that passed
the habilitation and qualified as full professors in 2012 published fewer articles than
rejected candidates, and this e§ect can be attributed to the increase in the productiv-
ity of barely rejected scholars more than from a decline in productivity of successful
candidates; ii) given the relatively small time span of data, an equally strong and
significant e§ect on the qualitative side is not found, but the average quality of the
publications of barely successful candidates in 2016 is larger than the one of barely
rejected scholars.
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2 Too Connected To Fail: Implicit Guarantees
and Political Connections
Abstract
This paper investigates the e§ects of political connections on implicit guarantees
of state aid for large European banks. By looking at the share of a bank’s board
members previously employed in the domestic government in a sample of large Eu-
ropean banks over the period 2007-2012, I find evidence of a strong positive e§ect
of political connections on implicit guarantees, proxied by credit rating uplifts, i.e.
the di§erential between the long-term and the stand-alone rating of the financial
institution. Coherently with this result, the e§ect of political connections on rating
uplifts is lower in countries that were most exposed to the sovereign debt crisis in
2010-2011, when implicit guarantees were lowered by public budget constraints. To
check whether the expectation of public support embedded into rating uplifts also
translated into an actually higher ex-post probability of receiving state aid, I also
estimate the e§ect of political connectedness on the likelihood of receiving public
support over the sample period. As a result, I find that political connections actu-
ally increase the likelihood of receiving state aid. Thus, results suggest that political
connections play a significant role as a determinant of implicit guarantees for bank
debt in Europe. On top of being too-big-to-fail, some European banks appear to be
also too-connected-to-fail.
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2.1 Introduction
When financial institutions - especially if large and systemically important - en-
counter di¢culties, governments often intervene to provide support to them. The
failure of a large bank can indeed cause severe damages to the whole economy, be-
cause of fire-sales, contagion e§ects and credit disruption. Therefore, averting the
risk of large negative shocks that would promptly propagate to the rest of the econ-
omy - as happened for instance after the failure of Lehman Brothers in 2008 - provides
the main rationale for the use of public funds to avoid bank failures. As a result,
many banks benefit from implicit guarantees for their liabilities provided by national
governments.
This expectation of public support has, as a direct consequence, an impact on
banks’ funding cost. Indeed, when investors believe that the government will not
allow large banks to fail, they will price banks’ securities accordingly. Anticipating
that they will not bear the cost of bank insolvency - at least not with certainty -
lowers the return demanded by investors, if compared to the one they would ask
in the absence of the subsidy and given the risk profile of the bank. The financial
companies that benefit the most from this subsidy are banks that are large and
systemically important: these banks are known as too big to fail (TBTF).
Empirical evidence of the existence of an implicit subsidy to TBTF banks has
been provided by several authors in the literature. O’Hara and Shaw (1990) exploit
the announcement made by the Comptroller of the Currency in 1984 that 11 banks
were ‘simply too big to fail’ and find evidence of a positive wealth e§ect for bank
shareholders of such banks, while smaller banks were negatively a§ected. Similarly,
Kane (2000) documents that megamergers in the US banking sector - in the period
from 1991 to 1998 - positively a§ect the stock value of the acquirer with the e§ect
being increasing in the size of the target bank.
Relatedly, Penas and Unal (2001) analyze 65 mergers in the banking industry and
show that bondholders of both institutions involved in the merger obtain positive
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returns around the announcement date, after which credit spreads also tend to fall.
Both the e§ects are positively associated with the size of the bank resulting from
the merger. Evidence of a flatter relationship between risk and funding cost is also
provided by Morgan and Stiroh (2000) that look at the relationship between bond
spreads and ratings in a sample of more than 4000 bonds issued between 1993 and
1998. More recently, Acharya, Anginer and Warburton (2015) examine bonds traded
in the US between 1990 and 2012 and - employing multiple measures of bank size
and risk - find that bond spreads are not sensitive to risk for very large financial
institutions.
Exploiting the time heterogeneity of government guarantees over di§erent peri-
ods between 1983 and 1991, Flannery and Sorescu (1996) show how the spread on
subordinated debt becomes more sensitive to risk when government guarantees are
lower, and provide additional evidence of the TBTF phenomenon. Similarly, Sironi
(2003) analyzes a sample of subordinated notes and debentures issued in 1991-2000,
and finds that credit spreads became more sensitive to the risk profile of the bank -
proxied by its stand-alone rating - in the second half of the 90s, consequently “to the
joint e§ect of the loss of monetary policy by national central banks and the public
budget constraints imposed by the European Monetary Union.” (p. 1).
Alternatively to bond yields, another way to estimate the impact of the TBTF
subsidy on banks’ funding cost is to look at the risk premium banks pay on uninsured
deposits. Jacewitz and Pogach (2013) use this methodology and find that, between
2007 and 2008, the largest US banks benefit from a 39-bps lower risk premium on
uninsured deposits when compared to their smaller counterparts. A similar results
is also documented by Imai (2006) in a sample of weekly deposit bank rates in
Japan. However, as pointed out by Acharya, Anginer and Warburton (2015), this
methodology can su§er from a number of limitations since large banks usually o§er
a di§erent set of services and products than small banks, and this can explain the
di§erentials in deposit rates.
A third approach that has been used to estimate the impact of implicit guarantee
21
is to look at bank ratings. Although rating agencies are not always correct about their
assessments, investors do look at ratings when making their investment decisions.
Therefore, credit ratings have a considerable e§ect on banks’ funding cost, as shown
by Morgan and Stiroh (2005). Moreover, since rating agencies release both long-term
and stand-alone ratings, the di§erential between the former and the latter - i.e. the
credit rating uplift - can be considered as a reliable proxy for the probability a bank
has of receiving external support. This approach has been followed by Rime (2005)
that examines a large set of banks from 21 di§erent countries, rated both by Moody’s
and by Fitch between 1999 and 2003, and documents a positive e§ect of bank size
on credit rating uplifts, the size of the e§ect being inversely related to banks’ stand-
alone rating. A similar result is presented by Ueda and Weder di Mauro (2012) that
quantify the value of the implicit subsidy embedded in the rating uplifts in 60 to
80 basis points. Focusing on a subsample of European countries, Schich and Lindh
(2012) get comparable results.
Thus, economists exhaustively documented the existence of an implicit subsidy for
banks that lowers their funding cost and can therefore generate a number of relevant
ine¢ciencies by: i) distorting bankers’ incentives to undertake risks; ii) hampering
competition in the banking sector; iii) generating an adverse feedback loop between
sovereign and bank debt value.
Still relatively unexplored, however, are the determinants of implicit guarantees,
other than bank size. The aim of this paper is therefore to analyze another factor that
possibly a§ects implicit guarantees: political connections. By using a continuous and
relatively new measure of political connectedness - given by the share of a bank’s
board members previously employed by the government of the country where the
bank is located - I estimate the impact of political connections on implicit guarantees,
the latter being measured by credit rating uplifts. Using data from 2007 to 2012 for
a sample of European banks rated by Moody’s, I document a positive e§ect of the
aforementioned measure of political connections on ratings’ uplifts, once controlling
for bank size - thus also testing the TBTF hypothesis - and other bank-specific
observables.
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In support of this too-connected-to-fail (TCTF) hypothesis, I find this e§ect to
be lower during the 2010-2011 sovereign debt crisis in those countries that were most
severely a§ected by the latter. In such countries, austerity measures imposed by the
European Union indeed reduced governments’ ability to provide implicit guarantees
to domestic banks, thus lowering the e§ects of political connectedness on credit
rating uplifts. Then, I separately test the extensive and the intensive margin e§ects
of political connections and show that both are relevant: being connected matters,
as well as the degree of connectedness. Finally, I use data on state aid in Europe
and document that the higher expectation of public support embedded into credit
rating uplifts actually translates into a higher ex-post probability of receiving state
aid for banks with more politically connected directors.
So, this paper also nests the relatively small strand of economic literature on
political connections and state aid. Among these studies, Faccio, Masulis and Mc-
Connell (2006) use a large sample of companies from 35 countries and find evidence
of an increase in the likelihood of receiving a bailout over the period 1997-2002 for
politically connected firms, that is, companies with at least a former politician sitting
in the board of directors. Focusing on the US banking sector, Thomas, Blau and
Brough (2013) use a similar bivariate measure of political connectedness together
with a continuous measure given by the amount of banks’ lobbying expenditures and
document that politically connected banks - and banks that spent more in lobbying
- were more likely to receive a bailout during the Troubled Assets Relief Program
(TARP) and to receive it sooner than their unconnected counterparts.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: section 2 describes the dataset and
the methodology; results from the analysis are provided in section 3; finally, section
4 concludes.
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2.2 Data and Methodology
The dataset used for the analysis is obtained combining four di§erent sources: i)
bank-specific data on the composition of the board of directors of European banks,
as of 2007, are from BoardEx; ii) long-term and baseline credit ratings are hand-
collected from Moody’s website; iii) state aid approved by the European Commission
come from the European Commission’s website; iv) a set of bank-specific observables
is obtained from Bankscope.3
As regards the key independent variable for the analysis - i.e. the measure of
political connectedness - this is obtained from BoardEx, a dataset containing informa-
tion on Board Members and Senior Managers of both private and quoted companies
throughout the world. After identifying all European banks - companies identified
in BoardEx either as ‘Banks’ or as ‘Speciality & Other Finance’ - I reconstruct the
composition of the board of each bank in 2007. Then I collect the available informa-
tion about each of the board members of the bank, and in particular: age, education,
gender, nationality and previous employments. Using this last piece of information,
I identify board members who were previously employed either as a board member
or a senior manager by the government - or by a company entirely owned by the
government - of the country where the bank is located. I identify these directors
as ‘politically connected’. Finally, I compute the ratio of politically connected board
members on the total number of board members in 2007, thus getting a continuous
measure - ranging from 0 to 1 - of a bank’s degree of political connectedness. Using
the information on age, education and gender of directors, I also construct a set of
bank-specific controls that are: the average age of the directors, the share of male
directors and the share of directors with a master ’s degree.
The measure of political connectedness I propose in this paper is relatively new in
the literature since, in most of the previous studies, political connectedness is treated
3Data on the board composition are from 2007 in order to mitigate the possible endogeneity
between board composition, bank performance and state aids in the following years, and especially
during the crisis.
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as a binary variable that equals one if a company has some political connections and
zero otherwise. This approach does not allow to look at the intensive margin e§ect of
political connectedness, and poses some identification concerns since connected com-
panies are likely to be systematically di§erent from the unconnected ones. Moreover,
to build this measure, I consider as politically connected not only those directors who
were former politicians, but all those directors who held a relevant position in the
domestic government and therefore developed a network of contacts with local politi-
cians. Even if this methodology can lead to overestimate the number of directors that
are e§ectively linked to the political world of the country, considering as connected
only those board members with former political experience would not capture all of
those relationships that come from directors’ network, thus leading to a systematic
underestimation of political connectedness.
Once obtained the bank-specific measure of political connectedness, I merge this
information with Moody’s ratings. In particular I look for the long-term and the
baseline rating for each of the bank in the dataset. As regards the former, I consider
the highest among the long-term issuer rating, the senior unsecured rating and the
long-term bank deposit rating at the end of each year. Such long-term rating is the
assessment made by Moody’s about the ability of the bank to honor its liabilities,
and factors in the probability of external support the bank might receive, if needed.
The baseline one, instead, is the stand-alone rating of the bank that abstracts from
the likelihood of receiving external support and can be therefore considered as a
measure of a bank’s financial strength and its intrinsic capacity to repay its debt.
The di§erence between these two ratings - once converted into two numeric variable
ranging from 1 (C ) to 21 (Aaa) - is commonly known as the credit rating uplift and
can be considered as a measure of implicit guarantees.
The information about banks’ board composition and ratings is then merged with
a set of yearly bank-specific observables from Bankscope. These include: total assets
(totass), net income (netinc), return on average assets (roaa), return on average
equity (roae) and share of tier 1 capital (tier1 ). The merger of these three sources of
data leads to a panel dataset containing information on 103 banks from 25 di§erent
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Panel A: Rated banks’ distribution by country.
Austria 3 Malta 1
Belgium 2 Netherlands 5
Cyprus 2 Poland 6
Czech Republic 1 Portugal 4
Denmark 6 Republic of Ireland 2
Finland 1 Romania 1
France 9 Slovakia 1
Germany 16 Spain 10
Greece 5 Sweden 4
Italy 10 UK - England 7
Lithuania 1 UK - Scotland 1
Total: 97
countries of the European Union. Removing banks fully owned by the government
and three outliers with more than 50% of politically connected board members, leads
to final dataset containing 97 banks from 22 countries.
Panel A provides the distribution of rated banks by country. The countries most
represented in the dataset are Germany, France, Italy, Spain and Great Britain,
where around 50% of the banks in the sample are located.
The distribution of the share of politically connected directors among the bank in
the sample is represented in Figure 1. As one would expect, frequency is decreasing
in the measure of political connectedness, i.e. conn, and the most populated bin is
the first one, that includes 23 banks with no directors previously employed by the
government. The median of conn is 11% and 75% of banks have less than 20% of
connected directors.
Summary statistics about the board composition of banks are presented in Panel
B. To compare more and less connected banks, I split the sample into two groups. The
first one includes banks with less than 11% of politically connected board members -
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Figure 1: Distribution of the measure of political connectedness
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Panel B: Board characteristics for rated banks
totBM male master age
Least connected banks
N 47 47 47 46
mean 12.976 0.911 0.159 55.296
p25 9.25 0.845 0 52.303
p50 13 0.953 0.122 54.953
p75 15.416 1 0.255 58.851
Most connected banks
N 50 50 50 50
mean 16.925 0.919 0.244 56.803
p25 12.333 0.861 0.087 54.75
p50 15.916 0.933 0.232 57.019
p75 20.583 1 .411 59.433
Full sample
N 97 97 97 96
mean 15.012 0.915 0.203 56.082
p25 11.667 0.857 0.014 53.462
p50 14 0.940 0.168 56.187
p75 18.083 1 0.306 59.253
since 11% is the median of conn in the sample - whilst the second one includes banks
with more than 11% of connected directors. Then I present the mean, the median,
the 25th and the 75th percentiles for the total number of board members (totBM ),
their age (age), the share of male directors (male), and the share of directors with a
master’s degree (master).
Panel C contains the summary statistics about bank-specific observables, as of
2007, such as the logarithm of total assets (totass), net income (netinc), share of
tier 1 capital (tier1 ), return on average assets (roaa) and return on average equity
(roae). As in Panel B, I report separately the statistics for the most and the least
connected banks.4 The table also includes the t-statistics for the di§erences between
4The two groups are sligthly umbalanced since some data from 2007 are missing in Bankscope.
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Panel C: Key financial data for rated banks.
totass netinc tier roae roaa
Least connected banks
N 43 43 39 43 43
mean 18.059 1, 358, 019 8.07 15.295 1.059
p25 16.779 135, 500 6.98 10.263 0.556
p50 18.075 593, 100 7.44 16.061 0.838
p75 19.116 1, 444, 900 8.87 19.293 1.261
Most connected banks
N 47 47 45 47 47
mean 18.759 1, 898, 037 8.385 13.717 0.911
p25 17.591 305, 000 6.8 8.763 0.341
p50 19.107 820, 572.1 8.06 14.957 0.805
p75 20.035 2, 030, 428 9.4 18.956 1.36
t-stat (µconn>.11 − µconn<.11)
2.03∗∗ 0.98 0.71 0.85 0.82
Full sample
N 90 90 84 90 90
mean 18.424 1, 640, 028 8.237 14.471 0.982
p25 17.172 228, 887.3 6.85 10.262 0.458
p50 18.513 643, 350 7.755 15.357 0.831
p75 19.797 1, 644, 100 9.25 19.272 1.28
the means of each variable in the two groups. None of this di§erences is statistically
di§erent from zero, except for the di§erence in total assets that is di§erent from zero
at the 95% confidence level. Most connected banks tend to be also larger than the
least connected ones.
As regards Moody’s ratings, these are converted into a numeric variables ranging
from 1, when Moody’s assessment is C, to 21 in case of a triple A (Aaa). Then I take
the di§erence between the long-term rating and the baseline one, thus computing the
credit rating uplift. Figure 2 reports the trends of the average long-term rating and
the average uplift, over the 2007-2012 period. Not surprisingly, long-term ratings
are constantly decreasing over the sample period, since the global financial crisis
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Figure 2: Trends of Ratings
lowered the expectations about banks’ ability to repay their debt. At the same time,
rating uplifts tend to increase during the onset of the financial crisis, due to both
the lowering in the average baseline ratings and the higher probability of state aid.
In 2010 - when the European sovereign debt crisis erupted - and 2011 - when also
the regulation about bail-ins was announced - uplifts start decreasing.
With the above-described dataset, I first estimate e§ect of political connections
on rating uplifts, as a proxy of implicit guarantees, using the following model:
upliftit = α + θct ++βconni + x
0
iγ + z
0
itδ + ϵict (1)
where connic is the bank-specific and time-invariant measure of political connect-
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edness of bank i, x0i is a set of time-invariant bank-specific explanatory variables - i.e.
the characteristics of the board, other than conn - and z0it the bank-specific and time-
variant controls, such as totass, netinc, tier1 etc.. θct captures country-time fixed
e§ects, that is, country-year-specific unobservables such as public debt and public
budget constraints that are likely to contemporaneously a§ect the rating uplifts of
all the banks located in a specific country at a given date.
I estimate this model under di§erent specifications - that is, including and exclud-
ing fixed e§ects and controls - and assuming a random-e§ects model. The coe¢cient
of conn is therefore estimated by GLS with standard errors clustered at the bank level
and, if positive, provides evidence in support of the TCTF hypothesis. A positive
coe¢cient for totass would similarly documents the existence of TBTF subsidies.
In the second model I estimate, uplifts are decomposed and the long-term rating
of banks is used as dependent variable, while baseline ratings are used as controls.
Indeed, changes in the uplift can be due to changes in both the baseline and the long-
term ratings. Moreover, the uplift itself might depend on the baseline rating of the
bank, being for instance larger for banks with a lower stand-alone rating. Therefore,
using baseline ratings as a control that captures banks’ financial strength allows me
to better isolate the e§ects of political connections - as well as the one of size - on
long-term ratings. The model estimated in this way is the following:
lt_ratit = α + θct + βconni + x0iγ + z
0
itδ + ϵict (2)
where lt_ratit is the long-term rating of bank i in year t, and z0it now includes
also the baseline rating, namely bs_ratit. To estimate the coe¢cient of conn I use
again GLS with clusters at the bank-level and including either country and time
fixed e§ects or country-time fixed e§ects, depending on the specification.
The β coe¢cient estimated using (2) is the average e§ect of political connect-
edness on long-term ratings. This e§ect is however likely to vary depending on the
baseline rating of the bank itself, since the long-term rating has an upper limit at
Aaa. For instance, in the extreme case in which the baseline rating of the bank is
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Aaa the rating uplift is, by definition, equal to zero and political connections play
no role. Therefore, one should expect banks with low baseline ratings to benefit
from larger uplifts and the e§ect of political connections to be stronger among those
banks. Preliminary evidence of this heterogeneous e§ect of political connectedness
on long-term ratings, depending on banks’ baseline rating, is presented in Figure 3,
where I represent the relationship between the two types of ratings for the 30 banks
with the highest share of connected directors in my sample and for the rest of the
banks, separately.
As one can notice, most connected banks tend to benefit from higher long-term
ratings than the rest of the banks in the sample, this e§ect being decreasing in their
financial strength, due to the upper limit of ratings. To account for this heterogeneity
in the e§ect of political connections depending on banks’ baseline ratings, I therefore
estimate the following model:
lt_ratit = α + θict + βconni +  conni × bs_ratit + x0iγ + z0itδ + ϵict (3)
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where  captures the marginal variation in the coe¢cient of political connect-
edness on long-term ratings, as baseline ratings increase. If the TCTF hypothesis
holds, this coe¢cient should be negative since an increase in conn has a dual e§ect on
the line representing the relationship between baseline and long-term ratings: first,
it increases its intercept and, second, it reduces its slope, given the upper limit on
ratings. Importantly, since a bank’s baseline rating varies over time, I can estimate
 in (3) including also bank fixed e§ects (θict), thus partially addressing endogeneity
problems due to banks’ specific unobservables.
The fourth model I estimate to test the TCTF hypothesis exploits the exoge-
nous decrease in implicit guarantees provided by domestic governments during the
European sovereign debt crisis of 2010-2011. If the coe¢cient of conn estimated
using (1) and (2) correctly captures the e§ect of political connectedness on implicit
guarantees for bank debt, one should expect this coe¢cient to be lower during the
crisis in those countries whose budgeting constraints were most binding. Therefore,
I create a dummy variable, crisis, that equals 1 for 6 countries - Cyprus, Greece,
Ireland, Italy, Spain and Portugal - in 2010 and 2011, and I estimate again (1) and
(2) including both the crisis dummy and its interaction with both conn and totass.
The model I estimate becomes:
Yit = α + θct + crisis+ βconni + θconni × crisis+ (4)
+φtotassit × crisis+ x0iγ + z0itδ + ϵict
where Yit is either the credit rating uplift or the long-term rating of bank i
in year t, depending on the di§erent specification I estimate. According to the
hypothesis that political connections increase implicit guarantees, when a country
experiences a crisis of its sovereign debt such guarantees are lower and the e§ects of
political connections should be reduced. As a result, I expect the coe¢cients θ to be
negative. The same does not necessarily happens with φ - the di§erential e§ect of size
on implicit guarantees during the sovereign debt crisis - since financially constrained
governments might prioritize TBTF banks to the detriment of connected banks.
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Moreover, large banks can benefit from implicit guarantees provided by supranational
authorities since these might have incentives to support systemically important banks
whose failure would put at risk the whole banking system. The same, of course,
does not happen with political connections, since they plausibly provide implicit
guarantees only at the national level.
Then, as anticipated in the previous section, I exploit the continuous nature of
the measure of political connectedness in order to look, separately, at the extensive
and intensive margin e§ects of political connections on implicit guarantees. To do
so, I create a dummy, Dconn, that equals 1 when banks have at least one connected
board member and then I replicate the estimates of (1) and (2) after replacing conn
with Dconn; then I estimate (1) and (2) using only the subset of politically connected
banks, that is, those banks with conn strictly greater than zero. The two estimated
models are:
Yit = α + θct + βDconn + x
0
iγ + z
0
itδ + ϵict (5)
and
Yit = α + θct + βconni + x
0
iγ + z
0
itδ + ϵict 8i : conni > 0 (6)
where Yit is either the rating uplift or the long-term rating, depending on the
specification of the regression. The estimated coe¢cient β in (5) can be now inter-
preted as the extensive margin e§ect of political connections on implicit guarantees.
If positive, it documents that connected banks benefit from larger implicit guaran-
tees when compared to banks with no connected directors. In (6), instead, the β
coe¢cient captures the e§ect of political connectedness at the intensive margins. If
positive and significant, it suggests that the increase in rating uplifts induced by
political connections increases with the magnitude of political connectedness.
To complete the analysis, I test whether the ex-ante higher expectation of public
support for connected banks embedded in rating uplifts actually leads to a higher
ex-post probability of receiving such support from the government. So, I merge the
dataset with data on state aid received by European banks during the 2007-2012
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Panel D: Banks distribution by country.
Austria 9 (2) Lithuania 1 (0)
Belgium 6 (3) Luxembourg 1 (0)
Cyprus 3 (1) Malta 2 (0)
Czech Republic 1 (0) Netherlands 12 (2)
Denmark 8 (0) Poland 7 (0)
Finland 3 (0) Portugal 5 (2)
France 20 (5) Republic of Ireland 3 (3)
Germany 30 (9) Romania 1 (0)
Greece 7 (5) Slovakia 1 (0)
Hungary 1 (0) Spain 11 (4)
Italy 23 (4) Sweden 10 (0)
Latvia 2 (0) UK 29 (0)
Total: 196
Banks that received state aid in parenthesis.
period. These data are collected from the website of the European Commission,
where all state aid cases approved by the Commission are reported (with NACE
code K). After identifying all banks in my sample that received public support, I
construct a binary variable state_aidit that equals 1 if bank i received state aid in
year t and zero otherwise. To perform this analysis, I do not need to restrict the
sample to banks currently rated by Moody’s, and therefore I enlarge the sample
including all banks I find in BoardEx with non-missing data from Bankscope. As a
result, I end up with 196 banks from 25 di§erent countries, with 40 di§erent banks
that received public support, in the form of loans, explicit guarantees or capital
injections at some point in time. The distribution of banks by country is provided
in Panel D. In parentheses, I report the number of banks that received state aid in
each country.
Panel E reports the summary statistics of board-specific observables, as of 2007,
relative to the group of banks that received and did not receive state aid, separately.
The statistics relative to the full sample are also included. For each of the variables,
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Panel E: Board characteristics.
totBM male master age
Banks that did not receive state aid
N 156 156 156 153
mean 11.647 0.928 0.196 54.976
p25 6.375 0.889 0 52.364
p50 11.083 0.959 0.159 55.101
p75 15.667 1 0.299 58.747
Banks that received state aid
N 40 40 40 40
mean 15.633 0.923 0.179 57.249
p25 12.375 0.873 0.007 54.779
p50 14.5 0.934 0.149 57.667
p75 20.417 1 0.285 59.661
Full sample
N 196 196 196 193
mean 12.461 0.927 0.193 55.447
p25 7.167 0.888 0 52.669
p50 12 0.952 0.157 55.994
p75 16.083 1 0.292 59
namely totBM, male, master and age, the mean, the median, 25th and the 25th
percentiles are reported.
Panel F reports the summary statistics for the other bank-specific time-varying
controls - totass, netinc, tier, roae and roaa - for banks that received and did not
receive state aid, and for the full sample, separately. The t-statistics of the mean
di§erences between the two groups are also included in the Panel.
Preliminary evidence from this summary statistics suggest that banks receiving
public support are, on average, larger in terms of total assets. This would be coherent
with the TBTF hypothesis. As one would also expect, banks receiving state aid
exhibit a lower return on average assets and average equity, given the di¢culties
these banks faced and that required government intervention.
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Panel F: Key financial data.
totass netinc tier roae roaa
Banks that did not receive state aid
N 142 142 89 142 142
mean 16.596 920, 473.3 10.359 16.182 2.097
p25 15.188 44, 234.12 7.2 9.418 0.592
p50 16.535 163, 306.2 8.59 15.499 0.985
p75 18.075 635, 200 10.5 21.97 2.201
Banks that received state aid
N 37 37 33 37 37
mean 18.765 1, 416, 346 7.696 12.956 0.931
p25 17.817 335, 300 6.62 7.259 0.392
p50 18.903 787, 600 7.22 13.896 0.763
p75 19.807 1, 704, 000 8.7 18.925 1.053
t-stat (µstateaid=1 − µstateaid=0)
5.52∗∗∗ 1.27 −1.88∗ −1.25 −1.84∗
Full sample
N 179 179 122 179 179
mean 17.045 1, 022, 972 9.639 15.515 1.856
p25 15.554 50, 800 7 9.313 0.488
p50 17.071 215, 400 8.1 15.137 0.907
p75 18.818 857, 000 9.76 21.258 1.842
So, finally, I estimate the following model:
state_aidit = α + θct + βconni + x0iγ + z
0
itδ + ϵict (7)
where x0i and z
0
i are the usual set of controls, and θct captures country-year fixed
e§ects. The β coe¢cient in this model can be interpreted as the e§ect of political
connections on the likelihood of receiving state aid. It is estimated by GLS with
robust standard errors clustered at the bank level. As a robustness check, I also
replicate the estimates assuming a logistic model, whose results are provided in the
Appendix.
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2.3 Results
2.3.1 Political connections and implicit guarantees
In the first set of regressions I estimate the impact of political connections on credit
rating uplifts. The GLS estimates from a panel regression estimating (1) are reported
in Table 1, under 6 di§erent specifications, from the least to the most conservative.
In column 1 the coe¢cient of conn on rating uplifts is estimated with no controls and
no fixed e§ects. In column 2, country and time fixed e§ects are included, separately.
The estimates obtained when adding country-time fixed e§ects that control for time-
varying country-specific macroeconomic unobservable are then reported in column
3. Finally, in columns 4, 5 and 6, I report the results obtained after adding a set
of bank-specific controls with and without fixed e§ects. Controls include: (i) board-
specific characteristics of the bank, as of 2007, such as: the share of male directors
(male), the average age of the board members (age) and the share of directors with
a master’s degree (master); (ii) bank-specific time-variant observables, including the
logarithm of total assets (totass), net income (netinc) in thousand of dollars, the
share of tier 1 capital (tier), the return on average equity (roae) and on average
assets (roaa). In all regressions standard errors are clustered at the bank level to
allow within-bank serial correlations in the error terms. I also estimate the same
specifications by OLS, whose coe¢cients are reported in Table 7, in the Appendix
and are comparable to the GLS ones, even if slightly lower.
The coe¢cient of conn is statistically significant, at least at the 90% significance
level, in all the specifications except (6), when it turns being not significant, but
still with a p-value lower 0.15. As regards the magnitude of the e§ect of political
connectedness, it ranges from 2.7 (column 3) to 4.2 (column 1). Therefore a10% in-
crease in the share of politically connected board members translates into an increase
of around 0.3 to 0.4 notches in the credit rating uplift of the financial institution,
approximately. Except for political connections, none of the other regressors exhibit
a coe¢cient that is statistically significant in at least two di§erent specification, in-
cluding total assets, that proxies for bank size. However, this does not rule out the
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Table 1: Results from a panel regression estimating equation (1).
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
VARIABLES uplift uplift uplift uplift uplift uplift
totass 0.268*** -0.178 -0.188
(0.0959) (0.152) (0.142)
male -1.960 -2.312 -2.136
(1.654) (1.801) (1.865)
age -0.126*** 0.00667 0.00421
(0.0388) (0.0464) (0.0479)
master -2.644** -0.628 -0.342
(1.044) (1.093) (1.098)
tier 0.0151 -0.00452 0.000962
(0.0107) (0.0168) (0.0105)
netinc -4.60e-08 -3.67e-08 -1.98e-08
(4.46e-08) (3.91e-08) (4.55e-08)
roaa 0.0560 0.122 -0.319**
(0.0983) (0.0991) (0.129)
roae -0.000534 -0.00101 0.00129
(0.00143) (0.00145) (0.00105)
conn 4.162** 2.897* 2.723* 4.887*** 3.871* 3.095
(1.637) (1.498) (1.624) (1.658) (1.983) (2.018)
Constant 2.533*** 3.323*** 0.884*** 6.690** 8.433** 6.363
(0.242) (0.455) (0.201) (3.382) (4.264) (4.288)
Observations 549 549 549 489 489 489
R2 (overall) 0.032 0.435 0.556 0.149 0.427 0.582
Number of banks 97 97 97 92 92 92
Country FE NO YES NO NO YES NO
Year FE NO YES NO NO YES NO
Country-Year FE NO NO YES NO NO YES
Robust standard errors in parentheses (clustered at the bank level). *** p<0.01,**p<0.05, * p<0.1.
existence of TBTF subsidies in my sample, since size can have two counteractive
e§ects on credit rating uplifts: (i) it enlarges the uplift by increasing the long-term
rating higher; (ii) it reduces the uplift by increasing the baseline rating. As a result,
the coe¢cient of totass on uplifts might be statistically not significant.
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Table 2: Results from a panel regression estimating equation (2).
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
VARIABLES lt_rat lt_rat lt_rat lt_rat lt_rat lt_rat
bs_rat 0.751*** 0.647*** 0.490*** 0.614*** 0.525*** 0.438***
(0.0602) (0.0645) (0.0515) (0.0544) (0.0652) (0.0605)
totass 0.573*** 0.410*** 0.450***
(0.0745) (0.107) (0.110)
conn 3.531** 3.152*** 3.321*** 2.610** 2.934** 2.063*
(1.376) (1.048) (1.103) (1.167) (1.201) (1.173)
Constant 5.919*** 8.361*** 8.842*** 3.991 1.857 0.278
(0.900) (0.889) (0.827) (2.606) (3.503) (3.525)
Observations 549 549 549 489 489 489
R2 (overall) 0.628 0.821 0.890 0.715 0.826 0.899
Number of banks 97 97 97 92 92 92
Controls YES YES YES YES YES YES
Country FE NO YES NO NO YES NO
Year FE NO YES NO NO YES NO
Country-Year FE NO NO YES NO NO YES
Robust standard errors in parentheses (clustered at the bank level). *** p<0.01,**p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Controls include: male, age, master, tier, netinc, roaa, roae.
Exactly for this reason, in the second set of regressions, I decompose the uplifts
and use as a dependant variable the long-term rating alone, thus including the base-
line rating as a control. This specification allows me to look at the e§ects of size and
political connections, while controlling for the financial strength of the bank embed-
ded in the baseline rating. Actually, this model is nothing but the same of the first
one, in which I do not impose a coe¢cient of 1 to baseline ratings. The estimates
of equation (2) are reported in Table 2. As before, in the first three columns I do
not include controls, and report the estimates obtained: (i) with no fixed e§ects; (ii)
with country and time fixed e§ects; (iii) with country-time fixed e§ects. In specifi-
cations 4, 5 and 6 the same estimates are reported, after adding the aforementioned
bank-specific controls. The same specifications are also estimated by OLS, whose
coe¢cients are reported in Table 8, in the Appendix.
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The coe¢cient of conn is now significant and stable under all the di§erent spec-
ifications I use to estimate equation (2): a 10% increase in the share of connected
directors increase the long-term rating by around 0.2-0.3 notches. As before, none
of the other controls appears as significant in all regressions - they are omitted in
the table - except for baseline ratings and total assets. Not surprisingly banks with
higher baseline ratings - and therefore characterized by higher financial strength -
have also higher long-term ratings. Moreover, the coe¢cient on bs_rat is lower than
one, which implies that uplifts tend to be decreasing in baseline ratings. The positive
and highly significant for totass confirms the TBTF hypothesis, according to which
large banks benefit from higher implicit guarantees for their debt than small banks.
This e§ect, however, does not o§set the one of political connections, and the two
coexist at the same time.
A further confirmation of this result comes from the estimates of equation (3),
that accounts for the upper limit on long-term ratings including an interaction term
between baseline ratings and political connections. GLS estimates of (3) are provided
in Table 3. In all specifications I include country-time fixed e§ects and bank-specific
controls. Since a bank’s baseline rating varies over time, I also include bank fixed
e§ects in columns 3 and 4, thus controlling for bank specific unobservables and
partially overcoming endogeneity concerns. Finally, an interaction term between
total assets and baseline ratings is included in 2 and 4.
Under all specifications, even the ones with bank fixed e§ects, the coe¢cient of
the interaction term between political connectedness and baseline ratings is signifi-
cant and around −0.4. The coe¢cient of political connections alone is also largely
significant under the first two specifications - it can not be estimated when adding
fixed e§ects - and measures around 8. These two estimates, together, document that
political connections increase long-term ratings, with the e§ect being lower when
baseline ratings are higher. For instance, a 10% increase in political connections for
a bank with a baseline rating equal to ba1 increases long-term ratings by around
(8 − 0.4 × 11) × 10% = 0.36 notches. In the extreme case of a bank with a Aaa
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Table 3: Results from a panel regression estimating equation (3).
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES lt_rat lt_rat lt_rat lt_rat
bs_rat 0.522*** 0.891*** 0.526*** 0.482
(0.0433) (0.332) (0.0482) (0.399)
totass 0.436*** 0.700*** 1.283*** 1.250***
(0.0973) (0.256) (0.374) (0.480)
conn 8.183*** 7.885***
(2.553) (2.549)
bs_rat×conn -0.456*** -0.429** -0.399** -0.403**
(0.172) (0.175) (0.189) (0.193)
bs_rat×totass -0.0201 0.00236
(0.0178) (0.0214)
Constant -0.280 -5.258 -14.29** -13.27
(2.502) (5.027) (6.906) (8.891)
Observations 489 489 489 489
R2 (overall) 0.902 0.904 0.558 0.557
Number of id 92 92 92 92
Controls YES YES YES YES
Country-Year FE YES YES YES YES
Bank FE NO NO YES YES
Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01,**p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Controls include: male, age, master, tier, netinc, roaa, roae.
rating, instead, the coe¢cient is approximately zero - (8− 0.4× 21)× 10% = −0.04
- since the long-term rating can not be larger than the baseline one, regardless of
political connections. The corresponding OLS estimates are reported in Table 10
and are extremely close to the GLS ones even if less significant.
Evidence from this first set of estimates confirms the too-connected-to-fail hy-
pothesis made in this paper: banks with more political connections benefit from
larger uplifts - or higher long-term ratings when controlling for baseline ratings -
than less connected banks. Evidence from these results also confirm the existence
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of implicit subsidies to large banks, thus providing additional evidence in support of
the TBTF doctrine.
2.3.2 Implicit guarantees during the European sovereign debt crisis
Estimates from the previous subsection show how political connections increase, on
average, implicit guarantees proxied by rating uplifts. However, this evidence is not
conclusive about the causal impact of political connections on implicit guarantees.
In order to partially rule out possible endogeneity concerns, I perform an additional
analysis, where I exploit the exogenous nature of the 2010-2011 sovereign debt crisis
to estimate the di§erential impact political connections have in countries that were
most severely hampered by the crisis.
If the TCTF hypothesis holds, when the domestic government su§ers from a crisis
of its sovereign debt, it is less able to provide credible implicit guarantees to the
domestic banking sector. Therefore, I do identify 6 countries that were particularly
a§ected by the crisis - namely Cyprus, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal, and Spain -
and I create a crisis dummy that equals 1 in 2010 and 2011 for banks located into
these countries. Then I estimate equation (4) by GLS - and by OLS, whose results
are in the Appendix (Table 11) - with clustered standard errors, and look at the
coe¢cient of the interaction term between crisis and conn. Estimates are provided
in Table 4.
All of the specifications now include the aforementioned set of bank-specific
observables, whose coe¢cient are omitted, for brevity. In the first specifications
(columns 1 to 4) I use the uplifts as my dependant variable and I estimate (3)
with and without fixed e§ects. In column 4, I provide the estimates obtained when
including, in the most conservative specification - that is, the one with country-time
fixed e§ects - also an interaction term between crisis and totass. Finally, in the last
two columns, I report the estimates obtained when using the long-term rating as the
dependant variable and including the stand-alone rating as a control.
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Table 4: Results from a panel regression estimating equation (4).
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
VARIABLES uplift uplift uplift uplift lt_rat lt_rat
totass 0.287*** -0.172 -0.176 -0.155 0.456*** 0.470***
(0.0947) (0.155) (0.141) (0.148) (0.110) (0.109)
conn 5.367*** 4.314** 3.552* 3.544* 2.306** 2.299**
(1.706) (2.049) (2.088) (2.096) (1.152) (1.157)
crisis 1.126*** 0.773** 1.047** 3.537 0.230 1.946
(0.263) (0.321) (0.496) (2.754) (0.499) (2.413)
crisis×conn -3.350* -3.000* -3.637** -2.982* -1.945** -1.494
(1.823) (1.820) (1.532) (1.657) (0.973) (1.055)
crisis×totass -0.135 -0.0931
(0.145) (0.120)
Constant 7.086** 8.383* 6.195 5.747 0.198 -0.114
(3.397) (4.289) (4.271) (4.423) (3.513) (3.545)
Observations 489 489 489 489 489 489
R2 (overall) 0.143 0.428 0.585 0.585 0.900 0.900
Number of banks 92 92 92 92 92 92
Controls YES YES YES YES YES YES
Country FE NO YES NO NO NO NO
Year FE NO YES NO NO NO NO
Country-Year FE NO NO YES YES YES YES
Robust standard errors in parentheses (clustered at the bank level). *** p<0.01,**p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Controls include: male, age, master, tier, netinc, roaa, roae and bs_rat in (5) and (6).
Firstly, the GLS estimator of the coe¢cient on conn is positive and significant in
every specification. Its magnitude is comparable to the one obtained when estimat-
ing (1) and (2). Estimates also confirm the hypothesis according to which implicit
guarantees provided by political connections are lower during the 2010-2011 sovereign
debt crisis. The coe¢cient of the interaction term, crisis × conn, is negative and
significant in all specifications but the last one, in which the p-value is however only
slightly larger than 0.10. Therefore, the e§ect of political connections on both the
uplifts and the long-term ratings is mitigated in the event of a crisis. As regards the
coe¢cient of crisis× totass, this is also negative but statistically not di§erent from
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zero, thus suggesting that the sovereign debt crisis had no (or a very low) impact on
the TBTF mechanism.
This can have di§erent explanations. For instance, it can depend on the di§erent
nature of implicit guarantees provided by political connections and bank size. While
the former is likely to be a purely domestic phenomenon, with politically connected
banks benefiting from an implicit guarantees provided by national politicians, the
latter can provide implicit guarantees also at a supranational level. When large banks
- that are too big to be saved by domestic governments - encounter di¢culties,
supranational entities may have incentives to provide support - either directly or
indirectly, by relaxing governments’ budget constraints - to the bank in order to
avoid its failure, since this can put at risk the stability of the whole banking sector.
Alternatively, this can be due to the fact that governments with limited capacity of
providing support to the banking sector, e¢ciently prioritize supporting large banks,
to the detriment of connected banks.
2.3.3 Intensive margin vs extensive margin e§ects of political connec-
tions
The continuous measure of the measure of political connectedness I propose in this
paper allows me to disentangle the extensive and the intensive margin e§ects of
political connections on implicit guarantees. Firstly, I use a dummy that equals 1
when banks have at least a politically connected director and I estimate equation (5),
using credit rating uplifts as the dependant variable. Table 5 reports the estimates
obtained under 3 di§erent specifications, from the least to the most conservative, -
where I control for country-time fixed e§ects - all of them including the usual set of
bank-specific controls.
The GLS coe¢cient of Dconn, confirms the extensive margin e§ect of political
connectedness: banks with at least a politically connected director exhibit larger
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Table 5: Results from a panel regression estimating equation (5).
(1) (2) (3)
VARIABLES uplift uplift uplift
totass 0.282*** -0.201 -0.210
(0.108) (0.160) (0.148)
Dconn 0.843** 0.734** 0.606**
(0.406) (0.305) (0.286)
Constant 5.266 7.595* 5.761
(3.331) (4.148) (4.145)
Observations 489 489 489
R2 (overall) 0.128 0.423 0.580
Number of banks 92 92 92
Controls YES YES YES
Country FE NO YES NO
Year FE NO YES NO
Country-Year FE NO NO YES
Robust standard errors in parentheses (clustered at the bank level). ***p<0.01,**p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Controls include: male, age, master, tier, netinc, roaa, roae.
uplifts than non-connected banks. The estimated coe¢cient is indeed positive and
significant under all the specifications presented. It ranges from 0.6 in column 3
to 0.85 in column 1, thus documenting that the credit rating uplift of connected
banks is around 0.7 notches larger than the one of banks with no director previously
employed by the domestic government. Of course, this extensive margin e§ect can
not be interpreted as causal since the two groups of banks are quite di§erent, both
in terms of observables and unobservables.
To test whether the e§ect of political connectedness on implicit guarantees in-
creases with the degree of political connectedness, I estimate equation (6) on the
sub-sample of banks with at least a director previously employed by the government
(74 in the sample). The GLS estimator of the coe¢cient of conn can be now in-
terpreted as the extensive margin e§ect of political connections. Table 6 presents
the results from the estimation of (6) under six di§erent specifications, all of them
including the usual set of bank-level controls. In columns 1 to 3, I use the uplift as
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Table 6: Results from a panel regression estimating equation (6).
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
VARIABLES uplift uplift uplift lt_rat lt_rat lt_rat
totass 0.172 -0.384* -0.318 0.578*** 0.334** 0.491***
(0.114) (0.214) (0.198) (0.0888) (0.141) (0.138)
conn 5.420*** 4.642** 3.753 3.453** 3.779** 2.771*
(2.013) (2.323) (2.469) (1.414) (1.487) (1.498)
Constant 11.02*** 14.94*** 11.82** 5.904** 6.894** 3.752
(3.534) (5.278) (5.308) (2.389) (3.462) (2.978)
Observations 393 393 393 393 393 393
R2 (overall) 0.187 0.402 0.558 0.742 0.832 0.914
Number of banks 74 74 74 74 74 74
Controls YES YES YES YES YES YES
Country FE NO YES NO NO YES NO
Year FE NO YES NO NO YES NO
Country-Year FE NO NO YES NO NO YES
Robust standard errors in parentheses (clustered at the bank level). *** p<0.01,**p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Controls include: male, age, master, tier, netinc, roaa, roae and bs_rat in (5) and (6).
the dependant variable, whilst in 4 to 6, this is replaced by the long-term rating. As
usual, standard errors are clustered at the bank-level.
The estimated coe¢cient for conn - that is, the e§ect of political connections
on implicit guarantees conditional on banks having at least a connected director -
is positive and significant in all of the regressions except for the one in column 3,
where the p-value is slightly larger than 0.10 (0.129). Evidence from these estimates
suggests that implicit guarantees increase with the number of a bank’s connected
board members. This provides evidence in favor of the existence of an intensive
margin e§ect of connectedness on rating uplifts and long-term ratings.
Putting together the evidence presented in Table 5 and Table 6, show that politi-
cal connections have both at the extensive and at the intensive margin.5 Banks with
5OLS estimates are provided in Table 12 of the Appendix and confirm these findings, even
though OLS coe¢cients are not always significant.
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political connections benefit from larger uplifts between their long-term and base-
line ratings, if compared to unconnected banks and this di§erence increases with the
share of a bank’s board members previously employed by the domestic government.
Such evidence also suggests that a continuous measure of political connection, as the
one I use in this paper, might be preferred to the bivariate measures often used in
the existing literature that do not allow to exploit the heterogeneity in the degree of
political connectedness of banks.
2.3.4 Political connections and the probability of state aid
Results from previous estimates documents how a bank’s long-term rating increases
with its degree of political connectedness, even when controlling for size, financial
strength and other observables of the financial institution. It seems that credit rating
agencies and investors expect politically connected banks to be therefore more likely
to receive support from the domestic governments, if needed. However, this ex-ante
expectation about state aid might not necessarily translate into an e§ectively larger
probability of receiving public support when the bank encounters di¢culties. To
test whether investors’ expectations are correct, I estimate the e§ect of political
connections on the realized probability for banks to receive such support over the
sample period, that is, from 2007 to 2012.
To this end, I estimate equation (7), using as dependant variable state_aidit, a
dummy that equals 1 if bank i received state aid in year t and 0 otherwise. Table 7
reports the estimated coe¢cient of conn on state_aid under 5 di§erent specifications.
In column 1, I report the estimated coe¢cient for conn on state_aid with no fixed
e§ects and no controls. The estimates including country, year and country-year fixed
e§ects are in columns 2 and 3. In 4, also the usual bank-specific controls is included
- except for tier, since this is missing for several banks - together with country-
time fixed e§ects. Finally, in column 5, tier is included, and (7) is estimated on a
smaller sample of banks. All coe¢cients are estimated by GLS, with standard errors
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Table 7: Results from a panel regression estimating equation (7).
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
VARIABLES state_aid state_aid state_aid state_aid state_aid
totass 0.0177*** 0.0246***
(0.00451) (0.00845)
conn 0.174** 0.252*** 0.252** 0.210*** 0.370**
(0.0864) (0.0953) (0.1007) (0.0816) (0.166)
Constant 0.0565*** -0.0313 -0.0154 -0.317* -0.468*
(0.0128) (0.0394) (0.008) (0.168) (0.264)
Observations 1,176 1,176 1,176 1,068 746
R2 (overall) 0.008 0.181 0.335 0.388 0.432
Number of banks 196 196 196 193 145
Controls NO NO NO YES YES
Country FE NO YES NO NO NO
Year FE NO YES NO NO NO
Country-Year FE NO NO YES YES YES
Robust standard errors in parentheses (clustered at the bank level). *** p<0.01,**p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Controls include: male, age, master, netinc, and tier in (5).
clustered at the bank level.6
The coe¢cient of conn is positive and significant at the 95% confidence level in
all of the specifications, thus showing that political connections actually increase the
likelihood of state aid for European banks in the 2007-2012 period. According to the
estimates obtained under the most conservative specification, a 10% increase in the
share of connected directors increases the likelihood of receiving state aid by 3.7%.
Not surprisingly, the coe¢cient of totass is also positive and statistically di§erent
from zero, thus confirming that size increase the likelihood of receiving state aid, as
the TBTF doctrine claims.
This last piece of evidence completes the picture on the e§ects of political connec-
tions on implicit guarantees for bank debt. Not only political connectedness increases
6The coe¢cients obtained with a logistic model are provided in Table 11 of the Appendix.
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investors and rating agencies’ expectations of public support - as documented by the
positive e§ect of political connections on rating uplifts - but this expectation appears
to be correct, being political connectedness positively associated with the realized
probability of state aid.
2.4 Conclusions
A relevant literature already documented the existence of implicit guarantees for bank
debt for large banks. However, little or no attention has been put so far on other
possible determinants of implicit guarantees, including political connections. The aim
of this paper is exactly to analyze the link between banks’ political connectedness
and the implicit guarantees embedded in credit rating uplifts to test whether - on
top of being too-big-to-fail - some European banks are also too-connected-to-fail.
By using a continuous measure of political connections, given by the share of a
bank’s board members that were previously employed in the domestic government, I
first estimate the e§ect of political connections on credit rating uplifts, and provide
evidence that larger shares of connected board members are associated with larger
average uplifts. This result holds when controlling for a number of bank-specific
observables - including other characteristics of bank directors - and when including
country, year and country-year fixed e§ects. I find that, on average, a 10% increase
in the share of connected directors determines an increase in rating uplifts by around
0.3 notches, when estimated under the most conservative specification.
Estimating a slightly di§erent underlying equation, where the dependant variable
is the long-term rating and the stand-alone rating is included as a control - thus
capturing the intrinsic ability of the bank to honor its liabilities - leads to a similar
result. In this case the coe¢cient of my measure of political connectedness ranges
from 2 to 3, depending on the specification I use, thus confirming that a 10% increase
in the share of a bank’s board members previously employed by government increases
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long-term ratings by 0.2 to 0.3 notches, on average. I also show that this e§ect is
heterogeneous across banks, since it is inversely related to banks’ financial strength.
Then I also exploit the 2010-2011 sovereign debt crisis as an exogenous shock that
a§ects some of the banks in my sample and estimate the di§erential e§ect of political
connections on implicit guarantees in the event of a crisis. According to the too-
connected-to-fail hypothesis, when governments experience a crisis of their sovereign
debt their ability to provide implicit guarantees for domestic banks lower. Empirical
evidence confirms this hypothesis, being the coe¢cient of political connections lower
in those countries most exposed to the crisis in 2010 and 2011. Much lower, when not
zero, is the reduction of implicit guarantees provided by bank size in the event of a
crisis. A possible explanation for this result is that large banks benefit from implicit
guarantees provided by supranational agencies, since their failure would hamper the
whole banking system. Alternatively, it could be that, when financially constrained,
governments can provide limited support and prefers to allocate it to TBTF banks,
more than to connected banks.
The continuous nature of my measure of political connections also allows me to
separately estimate the e§ect of political connections on implicit guarantees at the
extensive and the intensive margins. I provide evidence that both play a role in
increasing implicit guarantees, since not only connected banks exhibit larger uplifts
than non-connected banks, but the increase in the uplift is proportional to the share
of politically connected directors.
Finally, I test whether the higher expectation of public support embedded in
credit rating uplifts is also reflected by an actually higher likelihood of receiving
state aid over the sample period. Therefore I estimate how the realized probability
of receiving state aid covariates with political connectedness and I show that the
likelihood of receiving government support increases with political connections.
To conclude, political connectedness seem to be a relevant determinant - so far
unexplored - of implicit guarantees for bank debt in Europe. This too-connected-
to-fail hypothesis appears to coexist with the too-big-too-fail one. Future research
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can deepen the understanding of this link, testing whether the results presented
in this paper hold also outside Europe, and whether di§erent measures of political
connections - as for instance the degree of political connectedness among banks’
main shareholders - lead to the same conclusions. Also, a number of additional
controls, including banks’ holding of domestic sovereign debt can be added to test
the robustness of the results and to limit possible endogeneity coming from banks’
unobservables not included in this analysis.
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2.5 Appendix
Table 8: OLS estimates of equation (1).
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
VARIABLES uplift uplift uplift uplift uplift uplift
totass 0.290*** -0.109 -0.137
(0.0945) (0.117) (0.123)
male -2.185 -1.722 -1.332
(1.569) (1.787) (1.834)
age -0.113*** 0.00173 0.00397
(0.0364) (0.0394) (0.0388)
master -2.342** -0.381 -0.00371
(0.980) (0.984) (0.989)
tier 0.0384** 0.0142 0.0238
(0.0175) (0.0264) (0.0171)
netinc -1.19e-07* -5.05e-08 -4.89e-08
(7.07e-08) (4.55e-08) (6.09e-08)
roaa -0.0157 -0.0936 -0.677***
(0.123) (0.118) (0.191)
roae 7.73e-05 0.000938 0.00278
(0.00254) (0.00234) (0.00233)
conn 3.667** 2.504* 2.453 4.422*** 2.959* 2.281
(1.533) (1.383) (1.521) (1.414) (1.709) (1.735)
Constant 2.576*** 3.280*** 0.848*** 5.535* 6.857* 4.611
(0.238) (0.452) (0.100) (3.242) (3.504) (3.414)
Observations 549 549 549 489 489 489
R-squared 0.032 0.437 0.562 0.168 0.438 0.598
Country FE NO YES NO NO YES NO
Year FE NO YES NO NO YES NO
Country-Year FE NO NO YES NO NO YES
Robust standard errors in parentheses (clustered at the bank level). *** p<0.01,**p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table 9: OLS estimates of equation (2).
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
VARIABLES lt_rat lt_rat lt_rat lt_rat lt_rat lt_rat
bs_rat 0.719*** 0.623*** 0.546*** 0.546*** 0.470*** 0.414***
(0.0607) (0.0602) (0.0728) (0.0552) (0.0650) (0.0688)
totass 0.635*** 0.453*** 0.459***
(0.0822) (0.0998) (0.113)
conn 2.967** 2.892*** 2.936*** 1.980* 2.423** 1.743
(1.301) (0.939) (0.993) (1.063) (1.040) (1.057)
Constant 6.412*** 8.632*** 7.849*** 2.869 0.976 -0.609
(0.947) (0.853) (1.140) (2.724) (3.457) (3.482)
Observations 549 549 549 489 489 489
R-squared 0.628 0.821 0.892 0.719 0.829 0.902
Controls YES YES YES YES YES YES
Country FE NO YES NO NO YES NO
Year FE NO YES NO NO YES NO
Country-Year FE NO NO YES NO NO YES
Robust standard errors in parentheses (clustered at the bank level). *** p<0.01,**p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Controls include: male, age, master, tier, netinc, roaa, roae.
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Table 10: OLS estimates of equation (3).
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES lt_rat lt_rat lt_rat lt_rat
bs_rat 0.512*** 1.495*** 0.526*** 0.482
(0.0512) (0.342) (0.0591) (0.480)
totass 0.430*** 1.143*** 1.283*** 1.250*
(0.0727) (0.285) (0.485) (0.666)
conn 9.322*** 7.720**
(3.413) (3.651)
bs_rat×conn -0.559** -0.434* -0.399 -0.403
(0.235) (0.252) (0.250) (0.258)
bs_rat×totass -0.0535*** 0.00236
(0.0194) (0.0257)
Constant -0.923 -14.10** -13.25 -12.62
(1.798) (5.555) (9.099) (12.57)
Observations 489 489 489 489
R-squared 0.905 0.907 0.960 0.960
Controls YES YES YES YES
Country-Year FE YES YES YES YES
Bank FE NO NO YES YES
Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01,**p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Controls include: male, age, master, tier, netinc, roaa, roae.
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Table 11: OLS estimates of equation (4).
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
VARIABLES uplift uplift uplift uplift lt_rat lt_rat
totass 0.285*** -0.100 -0.127 -0.115 0.465*** 0.485***
(0.0939) (0.116) (0.123) (0.135) (0.115) (0.120)
conn 4.899*** 3.410* 2.785 2.773 2.080* 2.058*
(1.476) (1.878) (1.934) (1.945) (1.091) (1.100)
crisis 0.556 0.587 1.023* 2.586 0.356 3.024
(0.379) (0.370) (0.560) (4.060) (0.545) (3.789)
crisis×conn -4.740* -3.415 -3.959* -3.547 -2.632* -1.927
(2.499) (2.167) (2.180) (2.444) (1.543) (1.707)
crisis×totass -0.0847 -0.144
(0.213) (0.195)
bs_rat 0.415*** 0.415***
(0.0684) (0.0685)
Constant 5.606* 6.777* 4.497 4.238 -0.671 -1.117
(3.224) (3.491) (3.401) (3.638) (3.481) (3.607)
Observations 489 489 489 489 489 489
R-squared 0.173 0.440 0.601 0.601 0.903 0.903
Controls YES YES YES YES YES YES
Country FE NO YES NO NO NO NO
Year FE NO YES NO NO NO NO
Country-Year FE NO NO YES YES YES YES
Robust standard errors in parentheses (clustered at the bank level). *** p<0.01,**p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Controls include: male, age, master, tier, netinc, roaa, roae.
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Table 12: OLS estimates of equations (4) and (5)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
VARIABLES uplift uplift uplift uplift lt_rat lt_rat
totass -0.144 -0.166 -0.278 -0.223 0.398*** 0.490***
(0.123) (0.130) (0.168) (0.190) (0.127) (0.137)
Dconn 0.635** 0.478*
(0.255) (0.249)
conn 3.366* 2.642 3.146** 2.328
(2.009) (2.135) (1.321) (1.402)
Constant 6.465* 4.366 12.41*** 8.648* 5.740* 3.075
(3.430) (3.362) (4.293) (4.462) (3.365) (2.902)
Observations 489 489 393 393 393 393
R-squared 0.433 0.596 0.412 0.575 0.835 0.916
Controls YES YES YES YES YES YES
Country FE YES NO YES NO YES NO
Year FE YES NO YES NO YES NO
Country-Year FE NO YES NO YES NO YES
Robust standard errors in parentheses (clustered at the bank level). *** p<0.01,**p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Controls include: male, age, master, tier, netinc, roaa, roae and bs_rat in (5) and (6).
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Table 13: Results from a logit regression estimating equation (7)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
VARIABLES state_aid state_aid state_aid state_aid state_aid
totass 0.848*** 0.760***
(0.162) (0.190)
conn 1.961** 4.639*** 5.714*** 4.603** 6.365**
(0.812) (1.558) (2.122) (2.091) (2.771)
Constant -2.750*** -6.268*** -0.987 -16.12*** -10.05*
(0.204) (1.258) (0.644) (5.960) (5.683)
Observations 1,176 774 430 360 269
Controls NO NO NO YES YES
Country FE NO YES NO NO NO
Year FE NO YES NO NO NO
Country-Year FE NO NO YES YES YES
Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01,**p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Controls include: male, age, master, netinc, and tier in (5).
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3 The Production of Knowledge after Tenure: Ev-
idence from the Italian National Scientific Ha-
bilitation
Abstract
In this paper, we investigate how the introduction of a centralized evaluation
process for hiring associate and full professors in the Italian university system - the
National Scientific Habilitation (NSH) - a§ected the subsequent research produc-
tion of successful and unsuccessful candidates. The reform - introduced in 2010
to mitigate the extent of patronage in local competitions - restricted the access to
university positions to candidates complying with minimum requirements, defined
at the national level, in terms of quality and quantity of research production. The
main criteria used to define the sector-specific thresholds were: number of articles,
number of citations and h-index, computed in the ten years prior to the NSH. To
get the habilitation, candidates have to score above the median professor in their
specific field. Therefore, we exploit the discontinuity in the probability of obtaining
the habilitation induced by the minimum threshold and estimate a novel triple fuzzy
regression discontinuity design to estimate the e§ect of (getting closer to) tenure on
the quantity and the quality of scholars’ scientific production in the years following
the habilitation. We find that candidates that qualify as full professors publish on
average fewer articles than rejected candidates but on higher-quality journals, even
though this qualitative e§ect is small and barely significant. No significant e§ect
emerges in the sample of candidates for associate professorship.
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3.1 Introduction
There is an open debate on the mechanisms and the incentives leading to the produc-
tion of knowledge, which is a crucial research question in the education and economic
literature. Still, little is known about how scholars react, in terms of research pro-
duction to di§erent employment contracts and under di§erent hiring and promotion
mechanisms, even when these mechanisms are targeted to encourage and reward
’productive’ researchers, as for the case of tenure tracks. Do academics’ productivity
fall after they earn tenure, or get closer to it? Or is it the case that the research
habits developed during the tenure track persist after the goal is achieved?
We tackle this research question exploiting the introduction of a centralized eval-
uation process for hiring associate and full professors in the Italian university system
- the National Scientific Habilitation (NSH) - that became a necessary step for earn-
ing tenure in Italy. Candidates are evaluated on the basis of their academic cv, and
depending on their previous research production, the latter being measured by a set
of bibliometric indicators. Therefore, we exploit the discontinuity in the probability
of obtaining the NSH induced by overcoming or not specific thresholds, defined at the
academic field level, to compare the subsequent research patterns of barely accepted
and rejected candidates.
There is a small literature focusing on the post-tenure academic productivity of
scholars, both from a theoretical and empirical perspective. Most studies suggest that
research productivity falls after tenure: Holley (1997) shows that lifetime employ-
ment contracts lower the amount of published research among sociologists. However,
it is hard to disentangle a sharp fall in productivity due to the achievement of tenure
from a decline associated with age of scholars, documented, among others, by Oster
and Hamermesh (1998) and Levin and Stephan (1992). In contrast with the lost of
motivation arguments, other authors emphasize that this negative e§ect might be
o§set by the development of persistent academic habits during the tenure process,
which are not likely to vanish after tenure is achieved.7
7Faria and Monteiro (2008) provide a theoretical framework for the development of those habits.
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However, earning tenure might represent a broader achievement than just moving
to a lifetime contract: scholars, for instance, might also perceive it as a reward for
their research career. According to this perspective, our work is also related to
the ones of Borjas and Doran (2014) who investigate the productivity and research
choices of mathematicians before and after winning a prestigious award, the Field
Medal. Interestingly, their result suggest that the award of the prize is associated
with a decline in productivity, but also with a higher degree of cognitive mobility,
defined as the probability of switching to a new research field, di§erent from the
pre-prize baseline ones.8
Finally, we are not the first who studied the functioning of a national habilitation
system as a recruitment and promotion procedure for academics in public universi-
ties. However, most authors focus on the importance of candidates’ characteristics
not related to their research production in fostering the probability of achieving the
habilitation. Zinovyeva and Bagues (2015) analyze the centralized selection exams
in Spanish academia, providing strong evidences in support of the hypothesis that
candidates with direct connections with committee members are more likely to ob-
tain the habilitation. According to the authors, it is unlikely that the impressive
connection premium (50%) might be the consequence of information asymmetries
- connected committee members might have private information about other di-
mensions where the candidate excels - while it should be seen as an evidence of a
preferential treatment. Similarly, for the case of Italy, Abramo and D’Angelo (2015)
provide descriptive evidence that candidates already ’on sta§’ are more likely to
succeed than those external to academia.
Our findings document that, on average, candidates who passed the habilitation
for full professors publish less than rejected candidates in the three years following
the achievement of the habilitation. Even though we can not precisely distinguish
whether this result comes from a decrease in productivity for habilitated candidates,
8Similar to this paper are the works of Bricogne (2014) and Chan et Al (2013), analysing the
post-prize productivity of economists. In both cases, empirical results show that the award of a
prize increases subsequent scholars’ productivity.
or from an increase in productivity of rejected candidates, looking at the overall
trend in the average number of publications seems to confirm the second hypothesis.
Our contribution is twofold; first, we contribute to the literature analyzing the
link between productivity-based promotion schemes and scholars’ research outcomes;
then we propose a novel empirical approach to estimate a fuzzy regression discontinu-
ity design with multiple cuto§s and three running variable. This triple-discontinuity
design can find application in several empirical settings, where the discontinuity in
the probability of receiving the treatment has multiple determinants.
Furthermore, apart from representing an ideal natural experiment for addressing
our general research question, we think that an analysis of the functioning and con-
sequence of the NSH might be interesting per se. Indeed, similar hiring processes
have been established in many countries (Spain and Germany, among others) and yet
little is known on the welfare e§ects associated with the system of incentives implied
by such reforms. Therefore, our contribution can be seen also as a first attempt to
shade a light on how the production of knowledge of scholars reacts to centralized
evaluation systems based on ’bibliometric’ criteria.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: section 2 describes the regulatory
framework, summarizing the key aspects that characterize the National Scientific
Habilitation; section 3 explains the identification strategy adopted for our analysis; a
description of data and some summary statistics are provided in section 4; then, the
results from the first stage estimations - where we estimate the discontinuity in the
probability of passing the habilitation for candidates scoring above the thresholds
- are provided in section 5 while in section 6 we present the main results, that is,
the e§ect of the habilitation on candidates’ scientific production; finally, section 7
concludes.
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3.2 The National Scientific Habilitation
The Law 240 of 2010 deeply reformed the Italian university system. One of the
aspects mostly a§ected by the reform was the recruiting mechanism, with the in-
troduction of the National Scientific Habilitation (NSH) which e§ectively came into
force with the Presidential decree 222 of 2011. Prior to the NSH, the recruitment
process for Italian public universities was decentralized and each university could
hire or promote a faculty member autonomously. To mitigate the e§ects of local
patronage and favoritisms, the Law 240 introduced a new centralized system that
restricts the access to tenured university positions to those candidates complying
with minimum requirements established at the national level.
According to the reform, the selection of tenured academics now consists of two
steps. Firstly, academics have to apply and pass the NSH. Second, local universities
can hire as associate or full professors only those candidates who achieved the ha-
bilitation. The rationale for the habilitation is therefore to limit favoritisms at the
local level, restricting the access to local competitions only to candidates that were
pre-screened by national sector-specific committees, that evaluate all candidates in a
subject area depending on the quality and the quantity of their research production.
The reform identifies 184 competition sectors, depending on the subject area,
grouped into 14 disciplinary macro-areas. A judging committee composed by full
professors is therefore appointed by the ANVUR - the National Agency for the Eval-
uation of University and Research systems, also introduced by Law 240/2010 - for
each competition sector and candidates can apply to one or more sectors, to get the
habilitation either as associate or as full professors. To do so, they have to submit
their application accompanied by a curriculum vitae and a list of publications. The
committee then evaluates candidates on the basis of the scientific production of each
candidate - evaluated through bibliometric indicators computed by the ANVUR - and
taking into considerations a number of additional criteria including grants, teaching
experience, and others.
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As regards the judgement on the scientific production of candidates, the reform
establishes that this has to be made on the basis of three individual bibliometric
indicators computed directly by the ANVUR. In particular, the reform establishes
that, in order to receive a positive assessment on her scientific production, a candi-
date needs at least one or two - depending on whether the sector is considered as
bibliometric or not - of the three indicators be above a given sector-specific threshold.
In principle, complying with this bibliometric rule should be the main criterion when
evaluating a candidate’s scientific production, but commissioners can decide whether
to rely more or less strictly on this parameter. In the end, the weight that has to be
given to the indicators alone in order to decide whether to habilitate a candidate or
not is at the discretion of the committee and therefore varies across sectors. In any
case, the weights and the additional criteria adopted by the committee have to be
pre-determined and indicated in a formal statement that is then published on the
website of the Italian Ministry of Education.
Possible favoritism in the habilitation process is extremely limited by the fact that
commissioners are randomly drawn from a set of eligible candidates. Full professors
can indeed apply to be appointed as commissioners in their specific sectors and all
those applicants whose bibliometric indicators are above the median full professor can
be part of the committee. Then, among the eligible professors, four commissioners
are randomly drawn and a fifth member is then randomly selected from a list of
eligible professors working in a OECD country. Finally, commissioners remain in
o¢ce for a two-years period, at the end of which a new committee is appointed.
As regards the indicators the ANVUR calculates for each candidate, these vary
depending on whether the sector is considered as bibliometric or non-bibliometric.
For the 109 bibliometric sectors, the three indicators that summarize candidates’
scientific production are:
• i) number of articles published on journals covered by the main international
databases of peer-reviewed literature (Web of Science, Scopus) in the 10 years
preceding the application (normalized for academic age);
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• ii) number of citations received by the candidate for its overall scientific pro-
duction (normalized for academic age);
• iii) H-index, normalized for academic age.
In these sectors, a candidate to the habilitation as associate professor should
receive a positive assessment for her scientific production if she scores above the
median associate professor in her competition sector in at least two of the three
indicators. Similarly, a candidate to the habilitation as full professor needs two
indicators to be above the indicators of the median full professor in her competition
sector to receive a positive assessment.9
For the remaining 75 non-bibliometric competition sectors, the three indicators
are the following:
• i) number of monographs with ISBN code published in the 10 years preceding
the application (normalized for academic age);
• ii) number of chapter in books (with ISBN) and articles in journals published
in the 10 years preceding the application (normalized for academic age);
• iii) number of articles published in A-ranked journals, the latter being estab-
lished by the ANVUR.
In such non-bibliometric sectors, candidates as associate (full) professors, need to
score above the median associate (full) professor in their competition sector in one
indicator to receive a positive assessment on the importance and the impact of their
scientific production.
9The indicators for the median associate and full professor are computed after calculating each
indicator on the whole population of associate and full professors, respectively, in each competition
sector and then computing the corresponding medians
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Complying with the afore-mentioned bibliometric rule, based on individual in-
dicators, should constitute the main criterion commissioners take into considera-
tions when making their decision on candidates. However, the committee can decide
whether to rely more or less strictly on it but any judgment made on basis others
than the indicators need to be formally motivated by the committee in their final
assessment. Habilitated candidates have then eight years to get a placement in a
public university. If this is not the case, the habilitation exhausts and the candidate
needs to apply to the NSH again. Finally, in all sectors, failure to obtain the habili-
tation precludes the participation to the habilitation in the same competition sector
for two years.
The first round of the NSH took place in 2012, when 40.228 candidates presented
59.148 applications. The time-line for the first round of the NSH was the following:
• On the 27th of June, the first call for commissioners was published on the
website of the Ministry of Education. The deadline for the application was set
on the 28th of August.
• One month later, on the 20th of July 2012, the first call for candidates to the
NSH was also published. The deadline was set for the 20th of November.
• After the closure of the applications, the ANVUR published candidates’ indi-
cators and the selected commissioners were made public. After a few weeks,
the committees made public the criteria for their work and started evaluating
candidates.
• Most committees completed the evaluation procedure by June 2013, and all of
them by December of the same year, when results were made public.
3.3 Identification
In order to receive a positive assessment on their scientific production in the NSH
process, academics need to score above the median (associate or full) professor in their
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competition sector, in at least two of the three indicators calculated by the ANVUR
and discussed in the previous section. For instance, a candidate in a bibliometric
sector scoring below the median in the first indicator and above the median in the
third one, would need indicator two to be strictly above the median in order to
get a positive assessment, that in turn increases his chances to successfully pass the
habilitation. Therefore, medians constitute sector-specific thresholds above which
candidates’ probability of getting habilitated increases discontinuously.10
Thus, the NSH o§ers the perfect framework to estimate a (fuzzy) RD model to
determine the e§ect of passing the habilitation - and getting closer to a tenured
position - on a number of research outcomes in the years following the first NSH. In
particular, we can explore both the quantity (number of published research items)
and quality (share of articles published in journals ranked in the first quartile of
the SCIMAGO Journal Ranking) research pattern of candidates prior and after the
NSH. From an econometric point of view we face a framework with multiple (sector-
specific) cuto§s and three di§erent running variables, that we can either combine in a
triple-rd model or consider separately. Since committees have some discretion on how
strictly enforce the bibliometric rule, scoring above the medians is neither a su¢cient
nor a strictly necessary condition to achieve the habilitation, the latter being the
treatment variable in our scenario. It follows that the probability of receiving the
treatment does not jump from 0 to 1 when candidates score above the thresholds.
Still, overcoming the thresholds set by the Ministry discontinuously increases the
probability to pass the habilitation. Thus, we can estimate a fuzzy RD where the
probability of receiving the treatment is a function of candidate i’s distance from the
median in each of the three individual indicators, that we define as x1i, x2i and x3i.
In particular, let Dki be an indicator function that equals 1 when indicator k of
candidate i is above the cuto§, that is:
Dki =
!
0 if xki ≤ ck
1 if xki > ck
for each k 2 {1, 2, 3}.
10In non-bibliometric sector, the condition for obtaining the habilitation was to score above the
median in one out of three indicators
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Then, in bibliometric sectors candidates need at least two indicators to be above
the corresponding sector-specific cuto§, whilst in non-bibliometric sectors only one
indicator above the threshold is su¢cient to satisfy the indicators-based rule. There-
fore, we can define an indicator Di that is equal to 1 when candidates comply with
the afore-mentioned rule. Formally:
Di =
8>><>>:
0 if
3P
k=1
Dki < 2
1 if
3P
k=1
Dki ≥ 2
if the competition sector for candidate i is bibliometric, and
Di =
8>><>>:
0 if
3P
k=1
Dki < 1
1 if
3P
k=1
Dki ≥ 1
if the sector is non-bibliometric.
Let Pr(Ti = 1|Xi) be the probability of passing the habilitation for candidate i,
conditional on his indicators, our first-stage equation is:
Pr(Ti = 1 |Xi ) = α + f(Xi) + ρDi + γZi + ϵi, (1)
where: f(Xi) is a generic nth order polynomial in the three running variables, xˆ1,
xˆ2 and xˆ3, that equal candidate i’s distance from the median in each of the three
indicators; Di is the indicator variable that equals 1 when candidates score above the
median in at least 2 (1) indicators in a bibliometric (non-bilbliometric) competition
sector; and Zi a set of controls that include sector fixed e§ects. Finally ϵi contains
candidate-specific unobservables.
In equation (1), the coe¢cient ρ measures the jump in the probability of getting
the habilitation that comes from complying with the bibliometric rule established by
the ANVUR. Estimating ρ on di§erent subsamples allows us to measure how strictly
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the bibliometric criterion was enforced in di§erent sectors.
Then, we estimate the e§ects of getting the habilitation on a set of research
outcomes, that we define as Yi. Our second stage regression is therefore:
Yi = µ+ f(Xi) + β bTi + θZi + ηi, (2)
where bTi is estimated through (1) and therefore instrumented by Di. The estimated
2SLS coe¢cient β, in (2), captures the causal e§ect of the habilitation on Yi and
therefore corresponds to the Local Average Treatment E§ect (LATE). Then, we also
estimate the following reduced-form equation
Yi = µ+ f(Xi) + βDi + θZi + ηi, (3)
where the coe¢cient of Di is the Intention-To-Treat (ITT) e§ect.
Three main concerns might prejudice the validity of our estimates, since would
a§ect the validity of the RD setting itself: (i) the presence of manipulation, (ii)
possible selection in the sample and (iii) discontinuities in covariates.
The risks associated with an either selected or manipulated sample are partic-
ularly severe in a regression discontinuity framework, where the main identifying
assumption relies on a local quasi-random assignment of the treatment around the
eligibility cuto§. Thus, we have to rule out the possibility that candidates’ indica-
tors - our running variables - were manipulated in order to increase the probability
of habilitation of individuals just below (or above) the cuto§. At the same time,
given that our initial sample is not the population of eligible scholars, but rather the
sample of those who decided to apply, we need to prove that we are not comparing,
on the two sides of the cuto§, two di§erent and selected sample of candidates.11
We tackle both issues in two di§erent ways. Firstly, we look at the continuity in
the density on the two sides of the cuto§. Indeed, in presence of manipulation or
11With respect to the manipulation concern, it seems anyway unrealistic since indicators were
calculated by the ANVUR, and not by the di§erent committees.
73
selection, we should observe a discontinuity in the number of observations around
the di§erent thresholds. By looking at figures 1 to 3, where we report the distrib-
ution of applicants to the habilitation as associate and full professors for the three
di§erent indicators, this seems not to be the case, as no evident jumps occurs in the
neighborhood of the cuto§s. Then, we also look at the continuity in pre-treatment
covariates around the cuto§s. More precisely, we estimate equation (2) using as de-
pendant variables a set of research outcomes, analogous to the one discussed above,
but prior to the introduction of the NSH. We find covariates to be continuous around
the thresholds, as a further confirmation of the validity of our settings. Results from
these estimates are included in the section devoted to the results from the second
stage.
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Finally, and most importantly, our strategy relies on the validity of our first-
stage, since the e§ect of the treatment on research outcomes can only be estimated if
getting a positive assessment on scientific production e§ectively determines a jump
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in the probability of getting the tenure. We find this is the case in most sectors, and
we devote one section to present the results from our first stage.
3.4 Data
For each call of the NSH, the National Agency for the Evaluation of the Univer-
sity and Research System (ANVUR) publishes the list of the candidates, including
names, academic field of application and the score in each of the three relevant in-
dicators. Also, the sector specific medians, which represent the relevant thresholds
for obtaining a positive assessment on the scientific production, are published before
each call is opened.
These administrative records represent the main dataset for our analysis. Starting
from the list of candidates we retrieved the whole list of publications, by performing
for each professor a separate query in the SCOPUS website, the largest database
of peer-reviewed literature. Accessing the SCOPUS records of each author who
participated to the 2012 NSH call allowed us to acquire a rich set of detailed and
constantly updated information about her scientific production. Since the SCOPUS
database is structured at the publication level, it was possible to identify not only the
aggregate amount of the scientific production, but also the specific features of each
article, conference paper, book chapter and review published during the research
career. Therefore, we were able to construct a panel dataset at the author/year level
for a wide set of indicators including the number of research items in each year, their
quality - proxied by the quality of the journal where they were published - and their
specific research field.
With respect to the quality dimension, our indicators follow the SCIMAGO Jour-
nal Ranking (SJR) 2015. More precisely, for each publication in our dataset we
searched the SCIMAGO dataset to determine the quality of the journal where it
was published, obtaining both a continuous quality measure - the SJR index - and
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a discrete indicator for the research field specific SJR quartile.12
The list of the candidates who participated to the NSH in 2012 includes 39581
professors. Since the system allowed for multiple applications per candidate - to
apply in di§erent academic fields and rank - we had to select, among the 59 thou-
sands applications, only the one more ’relevant’ for each candidate. Dropping those
individuals for which it was not possible to select only one academic field led us to
a final sample of 32800 candidates.13
Furthermore, to estimate our second stage equations, we also drop all candidates
in non-bibliometric sectors, ending up with a list of 19415 candidates. The reason why
we exclude non-bibliometric fields is directly related to their particular nature. Those
fields - including Law, Humanities, Philosophy and Sociology - are characterized
by a research production hardly evaluable by pure bibliometric indicators. As a
consequence of this - and as it can be seen in the section where we present our first
stage results - the committees in most cases assigned little weight to the bibliometric
rule and considered a larger and more heterogenous set of criteria other than the
indicators.
The wide coverage of the scientific production of SCOPUS allowed us to retrieve
the list of publications for more than 90% of the professors in our restricted sample
of candidates, leading to a final sample size of 17703 applicants. Table 1 provides
some descriptive statistics about our final sample.
Finally, we provide in the Appendix - figures 7 to 12 - a graphical representation
of the heterogeneity in the thresholds across the di§erent competition sectors. On
12We also performed the same merge with the SCOPUS journal list, that includes di§erent proxies
for the quality of the journal, including the IPP and SNIP indices
13The criteria chosen for selecting a specific field for each candidate was the performance with
respect to the field median. Thus, for those candidates whose indicators were below the requirements
for a positive assessment we kept the academic field where the distance from the threshold was the
smallest. Coherently, for those candidates whose indicators were above the requirements, we defined
as the relevant academic field the one guaranteeing the largest distance from the threshold.
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics
Candidates for associate professor Candidates for full professor
mean sd max min mean sd max min
female 0.371 0.483 1.0 0.0 0.257 0.437 1.0 0.0
academic age 12.897 7.995 78.0 -5.0 17.962 9.855 129.0 -5.0
indicator 1 30.574 42.921 726.4 0.0 46.449 55.625 698.2 0.0
indicator 2 44.257 93.284 1464.2 0.0 72.401 115.750 1498.4 0.0
indicator 3 9.056 6.889 59.0 0.0 12.481 8.383 71.0 0.0
cuto§ 1 20.548 11.325 59.5 2.5 31.091 19.968 89.0 1.5
cuto§ 2 21.108 19.597 104.1 0.3 34.119 30.981 155.1 0.1
cuto§ 3 7.325 3.333 18.0 1.0 9.462 4.761 22.0 1.0
dist from cuto§ 1 10.025 37.922 666.9 -56.5 15.358 47.877 620.2 -83.0
dist from cuto§ 2 23.149 82.934 1360.2 -102.3 38.282 101.810 1410.7 -152.3
dist from cuto§ 3 1.731 5.321 45.0 -15.0 3.019 5.990 55.0 -17.0
articles 2009-2011 7.277 9.214 208.0 0.0 10.226 11.269 156.0 0.0
articles 2014-2016 11.269 21.476 279.0 0.0 16.167 28.660 577.0 0.0
Observations 13558 5857
average, the cuto§s are higher for candidates applying for full professors than for can-
didates applying for associate professors. Moreover, competition sectors belonging
to physics and health sciences, are the ones characterized by the highest thresholds.
3.5 First Stage Results
Our identification strategy relies on one key assumption: satisfying the indicators-
based rule produces a jump in candidates’ probability of getting habilitated. To test
whether this identifying assumption is satisfied in our dataset, we estimate equation
(1) discussed in the section 3. To do so, we firstly estimate (1) on the sub-samples
of bibliometric and non-bibliometric sectors, separately. The results from these esti-
mates are provided in Table 2, where the discontinuity in the probability of passing
the habilitation when scoring above the medians is estimated under di§erent specifi-
cations. In particular, in column 1 we estimate a quadratic polynomial on the whole
sample of candidates. In column 2 we also include academic field fixed e§ects that
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Table 2: First stage estimates
Panel A: Candidates in bibliometric sectors
Dependant variable: Prob(Habilitated)
(1) (2) (3)
Quadratic Quadratic LLR-MSE
Scores above cuto§s 0.342*** 0.350*** 0.219***
(0.015) (0.013) (0.046)
Sector FE No Yes Yes
Mean Yi 0.541 0.541 0.428
Observations 17703 17703 2941
BW1 5.511
BW2 5.594
BW3 2.040
Panel B : Candidates in non-bibliometric sectors
Dependant variable: Prob(Habilitated)
(1) (2) (3)
Quadratic Quadratic LLR-MSE
Scores above cuto§s 0.110 0.097 0.135
(0.100) (0.084) (0.091)
Sector FE No Yes Yes
Mean Yi 0.563 0.563 0.446
Observations 7392 7392 2001
BW1 5.511
BW2 5.594
BW3 2.040
Robust standard errors in parenthesis. ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<.0.10. In (1) and (2) a quadratic
specification is estimated on the full sample; in (3) a local linear regression within the optimal
bandwidths is estimated. Optimal MSE-bandwidths in the LLR are computed following Imbens and
Kalyanaraman (2009). Score above cuto§s is a dummy that equals 1 when a candidate scores above
the relevant median in at least 1 (2) out of 3 indicators in a non-bibliometric (bibliometric) sector.
Yi is a dummy that equals 1 if candidate i passes the habilitation and zero otherwise.
account for heterogeneity in the medians across sectors. In column 3 we report the
estimates from a local linear regression around the thresholds.
We find that the coe¢cient ofDi is highly significant and ranges between 22% and
30% in bibliometric sectors, whilst it is much lower (around 10%) and not statistically
di§erent from 0 in non-bibliometric sectors. As mentioned in the previous section, a
possible explanation for this relies on the di§erent nature of bibliometric and non-
bibliometric sectors. Since in the latter, by definition, bibliometric indicators are less
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Table 3: First stage estimates, bibliometric sectors only
Panel A: Candidates for full professor
Dependant variable: Prob(Habilitated)
(1) (2) (3)
Quadratic Quadratic LLR-MSE
Scores above cuto§s 0.453*** 0.448*** 0.280***
(0.029) (0.026) (0.084)
Sector FE No Yes Yes
Mean Yi 0.628 0.628 0.487
Observations 5383 5383 924
BW1 7.689
BW2 7.652
BW3 3.025
Panel B : Candidates for associate professor
Dependant variable: Prob(Habilitated)
(1) (2) (3)
Quadratic Quadratic LLR-MSE
Scores above cuto§s 0.310*** 0.319*** 0.255***
(0.017) (0.015) (0.043)
Sector FE No Yes Yes
Mean Yi 0.503 0.503 0.417
Observations 12320 12320 2847
BW1 5.702
BW2 7.211
BW3 4.030
Robust standard errors in parenthesis. ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<.0.10. In (1) and (2) a quadratic
specification is estimated on the full sample; in (3) a local linear regression within the optimal
bandwidths is estimated. Optimal MSE-bandwidths in the LLR are computed following Imbens and
Kalyanaraman (2009). Score above cuto§s is a dummy that equals 1 when a candidate scores above
the relevant median in at least 2 out of 3 indicators. Yi is a dummy that equals 1 if candidate i
passes the habilitation and zero otherwise.
appropriate to capture the impact and the quality of candidates’ scientific produc-
tion, committees did not enforce the indicators-based rule strictly, thus lowering the
impact this had in the habilitation procedure.
For this reason, from now on, we focus only on bibliometric sectors. Table 3
presents the results from the estimation of the first stage on the two subsamples
of candidates applying for being habilitated as associate and full professors, sepa-
rately. In both cases the coe¢cients are highly significant under all the di§erent
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specifications. For applicants as full professors, coe¢cients ranges between 28% to
45%, depending on the functional form we assume, whilst they are slightly lower and
around 25% to 30% for applicants as associate professors.
Then, we also check the robustness of our findings by looking at indicators 1, 2
and 3, separately, so as to provide also a graphical representation of the results. In
this case, we estimate the following equation:
Pr(Ti = 1 |Xi ) = α + f(Xi) + ρkDki + γZi + ϵi, (4)
for k = 1, 2, 3.
Figures 4 to 6 provide an illustration of the discontinuity around the cuto§s for
indicator 1, 2 and 3, respectively, and confirm our findings, while OLS estimates
of equation (4) are presented in Table 4. Estimates confirm that scoring above the
median in each of the three indicators leads to a jump in the probability of getting
habilitated, regardless of the other indicators. It is not surprising that the magnitude
of the jump is lower than the one we estimate under equation (1), since, by looking
at each indicator separately, we are not taking into account candidates’ performance
in the other indicators. Candidates might get a positive assessment also if below
the median, if the other two indicators are above the cuto§s, as well as being above
the median does not imply to comply with the bibliometric rule. For this reason,
our preferred specification is the ’triple’ regression discontinuity equation defined by
equation (1).
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Table 4: First stage estimates, by indicator
Panel A: Candidates for full professor
Dependant variable: Prob(Habilitated)
(1) (2) (3)
Quadratic Quadratic LLR-MSE
Score above cuto§ 1 0.165*** 0.180*** 0.156***
(0.020) (0.019) (0.037)
Score above cuto§ 2 0.284*** 0.303*** 0.287***
(0.025) (0.024) (0.031)
Score above cuto§ 3 0.236*** 0.248*** 0.242***
(0.028) (0.027) (0.048)
Sector FE No Yes Yes
Mean Yi 0.628 0.628 0.572
Observations 5383 5383 1949
BW1 7.689
BW2 7.652
BW3 3.025
Panel B : Candidates for associate professor
Dependant variable: Prob(Habilitated)
(1) (2) (3)
Quadratic Quadratic LLR-MSE
Score above cuto§ 1 0.164*** 0.153*** 0.113***
(0.013) (0.012) (0.023)
Score above cuto§ 2 0.179*** 0.191*** 0.149***
(0.015) (0.014) (0.018)
Score above cuto§ 3 0.167*** 0.189*** 0.196***
(0.018) (0.016) (0.024)
Sector FE No Yes Yes
Mean Yi 0.503 0.503 0.459
Observations 12320 12320 4713
BW1 5.702
BW2 7.211
BW3 4.030
Robust standard errors in parenthesis. ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<.0.10. In (1) and (2) a quadratic
specification is estimated on the full sample; in (3) a local linear regression within the optimal
bandwidths is estimated. Optimal MSE-bandwidths in the LLR are computed following Imbens and
Kalyanaraman (2009). Score above cuto§ k is a dummy that equals 1 when indicator k is above the
relevant median and zero otherwise. Yi is a dummy that equals 1 if candidate i passes the habilitation
and zero otherwise.
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Figure 4: Probability of passing the habilitation around cuto§ 1.
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Figure 5: Probability of passing the habilitation around cuto§ 2.
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Figure 6: Probability of passing the habilitation around cuto§ 3.
3.6 Main Results
In this section we focus on bibliometric sectors and we investigate the e§ect of the
habilitation on two main research outcomes: (i) the number of articles published in
the three years following the first NSH, and (ii) the ratio of articles published in
high-quality journals on the total number of published articles.14 Estimates of the
former capture the quantitative e§ect of getting (closer to) a tenured position, whilst
the latter capture the qualitative e§ect. We show both the Intention-To-Treat and
Local Average Treatment e§ects, under di§erent specifications. In order to explore
the time pattern of the estimated coe¢cients, and as a further confirmation of the
validity of our design, we also replicate our estimates by looking at the three years
before and after the NSH, separately. Finally, we explore possible heterogeneity in
the e§ect of the habilitation across di§erent macro-areas.
14High-quality journals are defined as those journals that rank in the top 25% of the sector-specific
distribution of the Scimago Journal Ranking (SJR).
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Table 5: Quantitative e§ect of the habilitation
Panel A: Candidates for full professor
Dependant variable: Articles 2014-2016
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Quadratic Quadratic LLR-MSE Quadratic Quadratic LLR-MSE
ITT -1.698 -1.322 -1.298
(1.040) (0.959) (1.141)
LATE -4.575** -4.639** -4.635
(2.295) (2.257) (4.023)
Sector FE No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Mean Yi 17.591 17.591 7.644 17.591 17.591 7.644
Observations 5383 5383 924 5383 5383 924
BW1 7.689 7.689
BW2 7.652 7.652
BW3 3.025 3.025
Panel B : Candidates for associate professor
Dependant variable: Articles 2014-2016
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Quadratic Quadratic LLR-MSE Quadratic Quadratic LLR-MSE
ITT -0.844* -0.135 0.129
(0.497) (0.461) (0.459)
LATE -2.824* -0.871 0.507
(1.572) (1.456) (1.755)
Sector FE No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Mean Yi 12.402 12.402 6.570 12.402 12.402 6.570
Observations 12320 12320 2847 12320 12320 2847
BW1 5.702 5.702
BW2 7.211 7.211
BW3 4.030 4.030
Robust standard errors in parenthesis. ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<.0.10. In (1), (2), (4) and (5) a
quadratic specification is estimated on the full sample; in (3) and (6) a local linear regression within
the optimal bandwidths is estimated. Optimal MSE-bandwidths in the LLR are computed following
Imbens and Kalyanaraman (2009). ITT coe¢cients are the OLS coe¢cients of Di in equation (3);
LATE coe¢cients are the 2SLS estimates of β in equation (2). Yi equals the number of articles
published between 2014 and 2016 by scholar i.
The first set of result we present is about the quantitative e§ect of the habilitation.
Table 5 presents the results from the estimation of equations (2) and (3) with OLS
on candidates applying for full and associate professor, separately. Our dependant
variable is defined as the sum of the articles published by each author in the period
2014-2016, that is, after the results from the first round of the NSH were made
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public. The estimated coe¢cient in the first three columns therefore represents the
quantitative Intention-To-Treat e§ect of the habilitation, while its 2SLS counterpart
- in columns 4 to 6 - captures the Local Average Treatment E§ect (LATE).
Results from this first set of regressions document the presence of a negative ef-
fect of the achievement of the habilitation on the number of articles published in
three subsequent years. Candidates habilitated as full professors published around
4.5 papers less than rejected candidates and the results are robust to di§erent spec-
ifications and to the inclusion of academic field fixed e§ects. This does not seem to
be the case when looking at the sub-population of candidates applying for associate
professor, for which the e§ect of the habilitation is much smaller, if not zero.
To dig deeper the time pattern of the quantitative e§ect of the habilitation, we
replicate previous estimates on the three years prior and after the first round of the
NSH, separately. Results are provided in Table 6.
On the one hand, it is reassuring that we do not see any significant discontinuity
in the years prior to the first call of the NSH, thus confirming the validity of our
design. On the other hand, we find that the overall negative e§ect found before is
mainly driven by 2015 and 2016, those years that are further in time from the date of
the NSH. The magnitude of the coe¢cients suggest that candidates for full professor
that passed the habilitation published around 2 papers less than rejected candidates
in both years while the e§ect is much lower - around 0.6 articles - for candidates for
associate professor, and not significant.
Two competing mechanisms can explain these results: either habilitated candi-
dates decreased their publications after the NSH, or rejected candidates increased
their scientific production. The nature of our data does not allow us to disentangle
between the two. However, some back-of-the-envelop calculations suggest that, since
the average number of published articles is higher in the years following the NSH, the
second explanation holds. Indeed, the e§ect of the habilitation seems to partially
o§set the increasing trend in the number of articles for habilitated candidates at
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Table 6: Quantitative e§ect of the habilitation, by year
Panel A: Candidates for full professor
Dependant variable: Number of Articles
2009 2010 2011 2014 2015 2016
LATE 0.300 -0.487 0.285 0.255 -1.926** -2.176**
(0.400) (0.427) (0.507) (0.752) (0.913) (1.096)
ITT 0.104 -0.196 0.123 0.086 -0.608 -0.632
(0.172) (0.182) (0.219) (0.329) (0.383) (0.469)
Sector FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Mean Yi 3.732 3.748 3.946 5.365 5.935 6.338
Observations 5221 5245 5259 5341 5379 5383
Panel B : Candidates for associate professor
Dependant variable: Number of Articles
2009 2010 2011 2014 2015 2016
LATE 0.081 -0.225 -0.076 0.298 -0.652 -0.638
(0.278) (0.319) (0.305) (0.693) (0.619) (0.706)
ITT 0.035 -0.066 -0.031 0.110 -0.134 -0.139
(0.086) (0.097) (0.095) (0.165) (0.195) (0.223)
Sector FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Mean Yi 2.622 2.711 2.886 3.756 4.203 4.473
Observations 11902 12019 12085 12247 12302 12317
Robust standard errors in parenthesis. ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<.0.10. In all columns a quadratic
specification is estimated on the full sample. ITT coe¢cients are the OLS coe¢cients of Di in
equation (3); LATE coe¢cients are the 2SLS estimates of β in equation (2). Yi equals the number
of articles published, in each year, by scholar i.
the cuto§s, that keep publishing on average the same amount of papers than before
(around 4) while the overall increase is mainly driven by those who were rejected
in the first round of the NSH. Candidates who are closer to the medians but still
below them might indeed have higher incentives to increase the quantity of published
papers before the next call of the NSH in order to increase their chances to pass it.
To conclude our analysis on the quantitative e§ect of the habilitation, we split
our sample in 6 distinct macro-areas - Mathematics and Physics, Chemistry and
Biology, Medicine, Agriculture, Engineering and Psychology - and we check whether
the e§ect of the habilitation is heterogeneous across sectors. Table 7 reports the
estimated Intention-To-Treat and Local Average Treatment e§ects on the number of
published articles after 2012.
87
Table 7: Quantitative e§ect of the habilitation, by macro-areas
Panel A: Candidates for full professor
Dependant variable: Number of Articles
Math&Phys. Chem&Biol. Medic. Agric. Engin. Psych.
LATE -7.492 -4.649 -4.699* 11.873 -4.736 -1.180
(5.479) (6.990) (2.757) (15.039) (7.861) (3.941)
ITT -2.431* -2.082 -2.871* 2.109 -0.754 -1.076
(1.361) (3.215) (1.584) (2.030) (1.217) (3.490)
Sector FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Mean Yi 6.579 29.901 19.689 11.869 11.690 8.592
Observations 435 1166 1613 397 990 152
Panel B : Candidates for associate professor
Dependant variable: Number of Articles
Math&Phys. Chem&Biol. Medic. Agric. Engin. Psych.
LATE -3.039 -1.004 0.017 4.672 5.746 6.919
(2.020) (4.991) (3.192) (2.841) (6.254) (7.957)
ITT -0.716 -0.396 0.141 1.418 0.555 1.798
(0.617) (1.412) (1.113) (0.953) (0.757) (1.881)
Sector FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Mean Yi 5.820 22.614 12.436 9.180 8.829 8.504
Observations 986 2541 3633 962 1992 534
Robust standard errors in parenthesis. ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<.0.10. In all columns a quadratic
specification is estimated on the full sample. ITT coe¢cients are the OLS coe¢cients of Di in
equation (3); LATE coe¢cients are the 2SLS estimates of β in equation (2). Yi equals the number
of articles published, between 2014 and 2016, in each macro-area, by scholar i.
Results from Table 7 document that a negative discontinuity following from get-
ting the habilitation as full professors is present is all sectors, except than in Agri-
culture. Coe¢cients are not significant in most cases, due to the small number of
observations in each sector that reduces the power of the estimation.
Apart from looking at the quantitative e§ect of the habilitation, we also explore
whether this a§ected the quality of the publications in the years following the first
call. We replicate the estimation of equations (2) and (3) using as dependant vari-
able the share of articles published in journals ranked in the first quartile of the
distribution of the field-specific SJR, over the total number of published articles. It
is important to point out that the share of articles published in journals belonging
to the first quartile of the SJR should not be interpreted as the probability of pub-
lishing in a top-field journal but rather as the share of relatively good publications,
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Table 8: Qualitative e§ect of the habilitation
Panel A: Candidates for full professor
Dependant variable: % of articles published in Q1 Journals
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Quadratic Quadratic LLR-MSE Quadratic Quadratic LLR-MSE
ITT 0.033 0.033 0.022
(0.023) (0.021) (0.059)
LATE 0.080 0.071 0.073
(0.050) (0.047) (0.183)
Sector FE No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Mean Yi 0.768 0.768 0.641 0.768 0.768 0.641
Observations 5188 5188 868 5188 5188 868
BW1 7.689 7.689
BW2 7.652 7.652
BW3 3.025 3.025
Panel B : Candidates for associate professor
Dependant variable: % of articles published in Q1 Journals
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Quadratic Quadratic LLR-MSE Quadratic Quadratic LLR-MSE
ITT -0.008 0.002 -0.002
(0.014) (0.013) (0.032)
LATE -0.027 0.005 -0.007
(0.044) (0.040) (0.119)
Sector FE No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Mean Yi 0.746 0.746 0.663 0.746 0.746 0.663
Observations 11520 11520 2639 11520 11520 2639
BW1 5.702 5.702
BW2 7.211 7.211
BW3 4.030 4.030
Robust standard errors in parenthesis. ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<.0.10. In (1), (2), (4) and (5) a
quadratic specification is estimated on the full sample; in (3) and (6) a local linear regression within
the optimal bandwidths is estimated. Optimal MSE-bandwidths in the LLR are computed following
Imbens and Kalyanaraman (2009). ITT coe¢cients are the OLS coe¢cients of Di in equation (3);
LATE coe¢cients are the 2SLS estimates of β in equation (2). Yi equals the share of articles publi-
shed in journals in the first quartile of the SJR between 2014 and 2016 by scholar i.
and therefore is a broader proxy for the quality of the scientific production. The
coe¢cients of the Intention-To-Treat and the Local Average Treatment E§ect are
reported in Table 8, estimated, as usual, under di§erent specifications.
The LATE of the habilitation on candidates as full professors is stable across
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Table 9: Qualitative e§ect of the habilitation, by year
Panel A: Candidates for full professor
Dependant variable: % of articles published in Q1 Journals
2009 2010 2011 2014 2015 2016
LATE 0.010 0.005 -0.020 0.036 0.002 0.120*
(0.091) (0.076) (0.079) (0.068) (0.071) (0.066)
ITT 0.000 0.003 -0.013 0.014 0.006 0.061**
(0.037) (0.036) (0.036) (0.030) (0.031) (0.029)
Sector FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Mean Yi 0.778 0.788 0.801 0.777 0.782 0.803
Observations 4496 4467 4547 4699 4678 4679
Panel B : Candidates for associate professor
Dependant variable: % of articles published in Q1 Journals
2009 2010 2011 2014 2015 2016
Habilitated 0.035 -0.014 0.028 0.002 0.003 0.023
(0.065) (0.073) (0.072) (0.058) (0.059) (0.061)
Scores above cuto§s 0.018 -0.000 0.007 0.001 0.001 0.007
(0.021) (0.023) (0.022) (0.019) (0.020) (0.020)
Sector FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Mean Yi 0.745 0.755 0.770 0.746 0.757 0.784
Observations 9450 9463 9665 10024 9924 9892
Robust standard errors in parenthesis. ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<.0.10. In all columns a quadratic
specification is estimated on the full sample. ITT coe¢cients are the OLS coe¢cients of Di in
equation (3); LATE coe¢cients are the 2SLS estimates of β in equation (2). Yi equals the share
of articles published in journals in the first quartile of the SJR, in each year, by scholar i.
the three di§erent specifications and close to 7%, even if not significant. As regards
candidates as associate professors, coe¢cients are very close to 0. However, given our
time span, we might not be able to capture a change in the quality of the scientific
production: the reward from devoting more e§ort to produce high-quality research
is likely to arise later in time. Coherently with this view, the only coe¢cient that is
significant and around 12% is the one relative to 2016, as documented by Table 9.
As for the number of publications, this result can come from two possible explana-
tions: either habilitated professors increased the average quality of their publications,
or rejected candidates did the opposite. Performing the same back-of-the-envelop cal-
culation we did when discussing the quantitative e§ect, together with the timing of
the e§ect itself, suggests that this qualitative e§ect is mainly due to the increase
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Table 10: Quantitative e§ect of the habilitation, by macro-area
Panel A: Candidates for full professor
Dependant variable: % of articles published in Q1 Journals
Math&Phys. Chem&Biol. Medic. Agric. Engin. Psych.
LATE 0.162 0.113 0.113 0.283 -0.288 0.496**
(0.517) (0.126) (0.123) (0.325) (0.462) (0.238)
ITT 0.060 0.047 0.063 0.130 -0.112 0.177
(0.163) (0.059) (0.070) (0.153) (0.103) (0.288)
Sector FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Mean Yi 0.634 0.831 0.833 0.725 0.772 0.671
Observations 334 1072 1410 346 835 117
Panel B : Candidates for associate professor
Dependant variable: % of articles published in Q1 Journals
Math&Phys. Chem&Biol. Medic. Agric. Engin. Psych.
LATE 0.137 0.121 -0.104 -0.007 -0.016 0.074
(0.246) (0.124) (0.212) (0.239) (0.368) (0.320)
ITT -0.010 0.036 -0.052 0.006 -0.005 0.031
(0.080) (0.034) (0.078) (0.074) (0.054) (0.122)
Sector FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Mean Yi 0.652 0.828 0.799 0.701 0.732 0.769
Observations 707 2190 2881 808 1562 407
Robust standard errors in parenthesis. ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<.0.10. In all columns a quadratic
specification is estimated on the full sample. ITT coe¢cients are the OLS coe¢cients of Di in
equation (3); LATE coe¢cients are the 2SLS estimates of β in equation (2). Yi equals the share
of 2016-articles published in journals in the first quartile of the SJR, in each macro-area, by scholar i.
in the average quality of publications for habilitated candidates. Indeed, while in-
creasing research quality takes time, reducing it would not require such a time lag
to emerge.
Finally, we present the estimated discontinuity in the share of publications in
top-25% journals, in 2016, by sector. Results are reported in Table 10.
Results in Panel A confirm that, in 2016, the share of articles published in journals
in the first quartile of the distribution of the SJR is larger for candidates that passed
the habilitation as full professor in all sectors but engineering.
To conclude, the NSH also had a qualitative e§ect - although not significant -
on candidates’ scientific production, at least in the subsample of associate professors
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that applied to get the habilitation as full professors. This qualitative e§ect is mainly
present in 2016, when habilitated candidates published a 12% larger share of articles
in top-25% journals than rejected candidates. The same e§ect is not present in the
subsample of candidates for associate professor.
3.7 Conclusions
In this paper we exploit the introduction of the National Scientific Habilitation - a
centralized evaluation process for hiring full and associate professors in public Italian
universities - to estimate the e§ect of passing the habilitation, thus getting closer to
a tenured position, on academics’ scientific production. The discontinuity in the
probability of getting the habilitation induced by the introduction of a bibliometric
rule - based on three di§erent candidate-specific indicators - allow us to estimate
a triple-rd setting, with multiple cuto§s and three running variables - in which we
compare habilitated and rejected candidates around the cuto§s.
The first stage estimation shows that the bibliometric rule was strictly enforced
only in those sectors that the reform identifies as bibliometric, whilst in non-bibliometric
sectors other criteria were predominant. Indeed, scoring above the median professor
sector leads to a 30% to 40% increase in the probability of getting the habilitation
in bibliometric sectors - for candidates both for full and for associate professor -
whilst no significant discontinuity emerges in the non-bilbliometric ones. Therefore,
focusing on those bibliometric sectors, we estimate both the quantitative and the
qualitative e§ects of getting the habilitation.
Our results document that the introduction of the NSH had a quantitative e§ect
on academics scientific production, at least in the subsample of associate professors
that applied to get the habilitation as full professors. Barely habilitated candidates
published on average 4 papers less than their unsuccessful counterparts from 2014
to 2016, with the e§ect being stronger in the last two years. This result is common
to all sectors with the only exception of Agriculture. We interpret this result as the
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consequence of the increase in the average number of published articles for rejected
candidates more than the result of a decrease in the scientific production for the
habilitated ones. Indeed, this explanation is consistent with the observed overall
increase, in the post-NSH period, of the average number of published articles per
year.
We do not find a significant e§ect in terms of the average quality of candidates’
research production in the three years after the NSH. However, this might be due to
the short-time horizon we are considering. Indeed, we find that candidates habilitated
as full professors published a 16% larger share of articles in the first quartile of the
distribution of the SCIMAGO Journal Ranking in 2016, if compared to rejected
candidates. Furthermore, by applying the same reasoning as for the explanation
of our quantitative result, we interpret this finding as a behavioral change of those
on the right of the cuto§, rather than on its left. In other words, this result could
be consistent with the idea that once achieved the habilitation, scholars invested in
producing high quality research, for which rewards might arise later in time.
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3.8 Appendix
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Figure 7: Distribution of cuto§ 1, by sector, for applicants for full professors.
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Figure 8: Distribution of cuto§ 1, by sector, for applicants for associate professors.
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Figure 9: Distribution of cuto§ 2, by sector, for applicants for full professors.
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Figure 10: Distribution of cuto§ 2, by sector, for applicants for associate professors.
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Figure 11: Distribution of cuto§ 3, by sector, for applicants for full professors.
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Figure 12: Distribution of cuto§ 3, by sector, for applicants for associate professors.
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